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Message-ID: <BANLkTimUD444DMA1Q2CQPFOEncBKvLVWpQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 20 May 2011 16:06:18 +0200
From: minor float <minor.float@...il.com>
To: ascii <ascii@...amail.com>
Cc: Full-Disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: New DDoS attack vector

dear ascii,

On 20 May 2011 15:43, ascii <ascii@...amail.com> wrote:
> On 05/20/2011 02:10 PM, minor float wrote:
>> not really, because we have seen that they've used more than one smtp
>> server for this.
>> minor
>
> Dear minor,
>
> the attack you proposed is very stretched and has an extremely low
> efficiency. What follows is my feeling about the issue and I don't
> exclude that I could be missing some key concept.
>
> The idea behind well executed DoS attacks is that little resources
> on the attacker's side cause big disruption on the victim's assets.
>
sending a spam campaign does not cost millions on today, right?

> This together with the fact that big MTA clusters are likely to use
> a caching DNS server to speed up lookups and delivery is enough to
> dismiss your research as largely uninteresting.
>

please note, that the variable 3rd level bypasses the caching.

> The call about the urgent need of a task-force to face this nasty and
> dangerous attack, in pure dnsinsky hype style, and the advice to
> "tighten the rules when reg­is­ter­ing the domains" make the whole thing
> hilarious.
>
imho it's hell about time to do finally something with the point that
somebody at the icann accepts the fact to have a profit from the spam
domain registration and other such things. you can blame me that i am
lame (and this is to all who want to tell that the attack is lame),
but instead of bitching on me, try to think seriously about
possibilities how to avoid this and other shit that is going on every
day. thanks god for all the ppl i've been in touch, we already
discussed some other workarounds. if you want to contribute, you're
welcome.

> Best quote: "As we already wrote in this paper, the num­ber of recorded
> bots dur­ing the attack obser­va­tion was about 14.000 with more than
> 100.000 spam mes­sages. The tar­get was just one DNS server and only one
> pre-registered domain was used. The white horse sys­tems were able to
> dis­rupt the DNS server oper­a­tion for more than one day and the effi­-
> ciency of such attack was very high."
>
> 14.000 bots to take down one DNS server? UMH.
>
yes, 14.000 bots took down the DNS server. no kidding! consider that
bot sends spam messages to multiple MX, and they perform a hell of
lookups.


> Cordially,
> Francesco `ascii` Ongaro
> http://www.ush.it/
>
> Original url: http://www.zone-h.org/news/id/4739
> Mirror: http://nopaste.info/848d88a621.html
>
minor

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