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Message-ID: <20110529114828.GA7683@SD6-Casa.iuculano.it>
Date: Sun, 29 May 2011 13:48:28 +0200
From: Giuseppe Iuculano <iuculano@...ian.org>
To: debian-security-announce@...ts.debian.org
Subject: [SECURITY] [DSA 2246-1] mahara security update

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Debian Security Advisory DSA-2246-1                   security@...ian.org
http://www.debian.org/security/                         Giuseppe Iuculano
May 29, 2011                           http://www.debian.org/security/faq
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Package        : mahara
Vulnerability  : several vulnerabilities
Problem type   : remote
Debian-specific: no
CVE ID         : CVE-2011-1402 CVE-2011-1403 CVE-2011-1404 CVE-2011-1405 
                 CVE-2011-1406


Several vulnerabilities were discovered in mahara, an electronic portfolio,
weblog, and resume builder. The following Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures project ids identify them:


CVE-2011-1402

  It was discovered that previous versions of Mahara did not check user
  credentials before adding a secret URL to a view or suspending a user.


CVE-2011-1403

  Due to a misconfiguration of the Pieform package in Mahara, the cross-site
  request forgery protection mechanism that Mahara relies on to harden its
  form was not working and was essentially disabled.
  This is a critical vulnerability which could allow attackers to trick other
  users (for example administrators) into performing malicious actions on
  behalf of the attacker. Most Mahara forms are vulnerable.


CVE-2011-1404

  Many of the JSON structures returned by Mahara for its AJAX interactions
  included more information than what ought to be disclosed to the logged in
  user. New versions of Mahara limit this information to what is necessary for
  each page.


CVE-2011-1405

  Previous versions of Mahara did not escape the contents of HTML emails sent
  to users. Depending on the filters enabled in one's mail reader, it could
  lead to cross-site scripting attacks.


CVE-2011-1406 

  It has been pointed out to us that if Mahara is configured (through its
  wwwroot variable) to use HTTPS, it will happily let users login via the HTTP
  version of the site if the web server is configured to serve content over
  both protocol. The new version of Mahara will, when the wwwroot points to an
  HTTPS URL, automatically redirect to HTTPS if it detects that it is being
  run over HTTP.

  We recommend that sites wanting to run Mahara over HTTPS make sure that
  their web server configuration does not allow the serving of content over
  HTTP and merely redirects to the secure version. We also suggest that site
  administrators consider adding the HSTS headers
  (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security) to their web
  server configuration.


For the oldstable distribution (lenny), these problems have been fixed in
version 1.0.4-4+lenny10.

For the stable distribution (squeeze), these problems have been fixed in
version 1.2.6-2+squeeze2.

For the testing distribution (wheezy), these problems have been fixed in
version 1.3.6-1.

For the unstable distribution (sid), these problems have been fixed in
version 1.3.6-1.

We recommend that you upgrade your mahara packages.

Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: http://www.debian.org/security/

Mailing list: debian-security-announce@...ts.debian.org
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