full-disclosure - Re: OT: best practices in formal verification and security

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Date: Mon, 30 May 2011 17:09:14 +0300
From: Georgi Guninski <guninski@...inski.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: OT: best practices in formal verification and
 security

coq developers appear to do forensics this way:
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.mathematics.logic.coq.club/6228


the academic approach (detached from current implementations imho) is:

How to Believe a Machine-Checked Proof, Robert Pollack
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.72.7610&rep=rep1&type=pdf


On Sat, May 14, 2011 at 08:21:13PM +0300, Georgi Guninski wrote:
> sorry for OT.
> 
> i am trying to convince a client a bit counterintuitive Coq proof about security is valid.
> 
> i can make Coq generate .vo certificates that match the source (human forensic would be happy with this part i suppose).
> 
> how do i mitigate human forensic analysis of the proof, what the human forensics will look for? any introductory books?
> 
> what if the proof is big (about 3GB) and computer generated?
> 
> 10x.
> 
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