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Message-Id: <56ED989C-398F-402E-AC6E-293714C78B21@7bits.nl>
Date: Tue, 31 May 2011 05:55:27 +0200
From: Peter van Dijk <peter@...ts.nl>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Leveraging pam_env to steal DSA keys
On May 31, 2011, at 12:48 AM, paul.szabo@...ney.edu.au wrote:
>> ... http://7bits.nl/projects/pamenv-dsakeys/pamenv-dsakeys.html
>
> Seems to me that CVE-2010-3435 may allow users to determine also:
> password in /etc/lilo.conf
> secret in /etc/bind/named.conf /etc/bind/rndc.conf /etc/bind/rndc.key
> bits of /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
> which should all be protected.
- lilo.conf commonly has whitespace around '=', pam_env does not tolerate that
- bind configs don't even use '=' and are often indented, pam_env does not tolerate indents
- RSA appears to be uninteresting in that the amount of bits we can lift is not sufficient to make an attack feasible (this is in the article!)
- the DSA host key certainly is a target
If I understand correctly, Debian (and, I presume, Ubuntu) put this bug on low priority precisely because there were very few practical applications that they knew of.
Cheers, Peter
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