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Message-id: <201106011100.phone@psirt.cisco.com>
Date: Wed,  1 Jun 2011 11:33:00 -0400
From: Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team <psirt@...co.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Cc: psirt@...co.com
Subject: Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities
	in Cisco Unified IP Phones 7900 Series

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Unified IP
Phones 7900 Series

Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20110601-phone

Revision 1.0

For Public Release 2011 June 1 1600 UTC (GMT)

+----------------------------------------------------------------

Summary
=======

Cisco Unified IP Phones 7900 Series devices, also known as TNP
phones, are affected by three vulnerabilities that could allow an
attacker to elevate privileges, change phone configurations, disclose
sensitive information, or load unsigned software. These three
vulnerabilities are classified as two privilege escalation
vulnerabilities and one signature bypass vulnerability.

Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. There are no workarounds available to mitigate these
vulnerabilities.

This advisory is posted at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110601-phone.shtml.

Affected Products
=================

Only Cisco Unified IP Phones 7900 Series devices, also known as TNP
phones, are affected.

 

Vulnerable Products
+------------------

The following Cisco Unified IP Phone devices are affected:

  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7975G
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7971G-GE
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7970G
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7965G
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7962G
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7961G
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7961G-GE
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7945G
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7942G
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7941G
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7941G-GE
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7931G
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7911G
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7906

The following models have reached end-of-life (EOL) status (for
hardware only):

  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7971G-GE
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7970G
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7961G
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7961G-GE
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7941G
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7941G-GE
  * Cisco Unified IP Phone 7906

Refer to the following link to determine what product upgrade and
substitution options are available:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/phones/ps379/prod_eol_notices_list.html

 

Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------

No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities.
 

Details
=======

Cisco Unified IP Phones 7900 Series devices are affected by two
privilege escalation vulnerabilities and a signature bypass
vulnerability. The following sections provide the details of each
vulnerability addressed in this security advisory.

Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities
+------------------------------------
Cisco Unified IP Phones 7900 Series devices are affected by two
privilege escalation vulnerabilities that could allow an
authenticated attacker to make unauthorized phone configuration
changes or obtain potentially sensitive information.

These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCtf07426 
and CSCtn65815 and have been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVE) identifiers CVE-2011-1602 and CVE-2011-1603 
respectively.

Signature Verification Bypass Vulnerability
+------------------------------------------
Cisco Unified IP Phones 7900 Series devices are affected by a
signature verification bypass vulnerability that could allow an
authenticated attacker to load a software image without verification
of its signature.

This vulnerability is documented in Cisco bug ID CSCtn65962
and has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2011-1637.

Vulnerability Scoring Details
+----------------------------
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS
scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS
version 2.0.

CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.

Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of
the vulnerability in individual networks.

Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding
CVSS at:

http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html

Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:

http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss 

* CSCtf07426 - Privilege Escalation with "su" utility

CVSS Base Score - 6.6
    Access Vector -            Local
    Access Complexity -        Medium
    Authentication -           Single
    Confidentiality Impact -   Complete
    Integrity Impact -         Complete
    Availability Impact -      Complete

CVSS Temporal Score - 5.5
    Exploitability -           Functional
    Remediation Level -        Official-Fix
    Report Confidence -        Confirmed


* CSCtn65815 - Privilege Escalation in IP Phones

CVSS Base Score - 6.6
    Access Vector -            Local
    Access Complexity -        Medium
    Authentication -           Single
    Confidentiality Impact -   Complete
    Integrity Impact -         Complete
    Availability Impact -      Complete

CVSS Temporal Score - 5.5
    Exploitability -           Functional
    Remediation Level -        Official-Fix
    Report Confidence -        Confirmed


* CSCtn65962 - Phones Permits the Installation of Unsigned Code

CVSS Base Score - 1.5
    Access Vector -            Local
    Access Complexity -        Medium
    Authentication -           Single
    Confidentiality Impact -   Partial
    Integrity Impact -         None
    Availability Impact -      None

CVSS Temporal Score - 1.2
    Exploitability -           Functional
    Remediation Level -        Official-Fix
    Report Confidence -        Confirmed

Impact
======

Successful exploitation of the two privilege escalation
vulnerabilities could allow an authenticated attacker to change phone
configuration and obtain system information.

Successful exploitation of the signature verification bypass
vulnerability that could allow an authenticated attacker to load and
execute a software image without verification of its signature.
 

Software Versions and Fixes
===========================

When considering software upgrades, also consult:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to 
determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.

In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.

+---------------------------------------+
|                            | First    |
| Vulnerability              | Fixed    |
|                            | Release  |
|----------------------------+----------|
| CSCtf07426 - Privilege     |          |
| Escalation with "su"       | 9.0.3    |
| utility                    |          |
|----------------------------+----------|
| CSCtn65815 - Privilege     | 9.2.1    |
| Escalation in IP Phones    |          |
|----------------------------+----------|
| CSCtn65962 - Phones        |          |
| Permits the Installation   | 9.2.1    |
| of Unsigned Code           |          |
+---------------------------------------+

 

Workarounds
===========

There are no workarounds available to mitigate any of these
vulnerabilities. Note: All of these vulnerabilities require the
attacker to be authenticated.
 

Obtaining Fixed Software
========================

Cisco has released free software updates that address these
vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should
consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature
set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.

Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets
they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or
otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound
by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html 
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at:
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml

Do not contact psirt@...co.com or security-alert@...co.com for
software upgrades.

 

Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------

Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through
their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com

 

Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------

Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through
prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations,
such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance
with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.

The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it
is deployed.

 
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------

Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco
service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party
vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through
their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.

  * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
  * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
  * e-mail: tac@...co.com

Customers should have their product serial number available and be
prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to
a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be
requested through the TAC.

Refer to:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html 
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone 
numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
 

Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================

The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.

These vulnerabilities were discovered and reported to Cisco by Matt
Duggan of Qualcomm.
 

Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain
factual errors.
 

Distribution
============

This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:

http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20110601-phone.shtml

In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice
is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.

  * cust-security-announce@...co.com
  * first-bulletins@...ts.first.org
  * bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
  * vulnwatch@...nwatch.org
  * cisco@...t.colorado.edu
  * cisco-nsp@...k.nether.net
  * full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
  * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@...sgate.cisco.com

Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on
mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
 

Revision History
================

+---------------------------------------+
| Revision |              | Initial     |
| 1.0      | 2011-June-01 | public      |
|          |              | release.    |
+---------------------------------------+

 

Cisco Security Procedures
=========================

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices.
All Cisco security advisories are available at:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt

+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 2010-2011 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------

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