Message-ID: <CAKYRZdBK+iZ5Ddnc+eeRa11E1C+d6Y8P_=i=9PbBLrgaFc32pw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2011 16:24:18 -0500
From: James Voss <james.voss@...thwestdedicated.com>
To: Chris Truncer <CTruncer@...istophertruncer.com>
Cc: "full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>,
	"submissions@...ketstormsecurity.org" <submissions@...ketstormsecurity.org>
Subject: Re: URL Spoofing vulnerability in different
	browsers

Lol, okay

-- 
Regards,

James Voss <james.voss@...thwestdedicated.com>
LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/jameswvoss
312-000-0000 - Direct
847-000-0000 - Fax

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On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 4:15 PM, Chris Truncer <
CTruncer@...istophertruncer.com> wrote:

> Just ignore Mustlive. The rest of the list does.
>
>
>
> On Jul 22, 2011, at 4:08 PM, Chris Evans <scarybeasts@...il.com> wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Jul 22, 2011 at 8:36 AM, MustLive <mustlive@...security.com.ua>
> wrote:
> >> Hello list!
> >>
> >> I want to warn you about URL Spoofing vulnerability in Mozilla Firefox,
> >> Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Opera and other browsers. I found it
> long
> >> time ago, at 6th of February 2008, just after finding of built-in CSRF
> >> vulnerability in Mozilla and Firefox (it's funky CSRF attack via
> prefetching
> >> functionality), which I described at my site in March.
> >>
> >> -------------------------
> >> Affected products:
> >> -------------------------
> >>
> >> Vulnerable are all browsers which support Basic/Digest Authentication.
> It's
> >> all modern browsers and many from old browsers. In particular affected
> are
> >> Mozilla Firefox 3.0.19, 3.5.11, 3.6.8, Firefox 4.0b2 (and Mozilla and
> all
> >> other Gecko-based browsers), Internet Explorer 6, 7, 8, Google Chrome
> >> 1.0.154.48 and Opera 10.62 and previous and next versions of these
> browsers.
> >> And other browsers which support Basic/Digest Authentication.
> >>
> >> In March, after my informing, Mozilla opened Bug 647010 in Bugzilla
> >> (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=647010).
> >>
> >> Among four browsers developers informed by me only Mozilla said, that
> they
> >> are planning to fix this vulnerability (without specifying the time).
> Google
> >> even didn't answer me, but in June they informed in their blog
> >> (
> http://blog.chromium.org/2011/06/new-chromium-security-features-june.html
> ),
> >> that they fixed this vulnerability in browsers Chrome 13 (it's now beta
> >> version) and higher.
> >>
> >> ----------
> >> Details:
> >> ----------
> >>
> >> This is better to call attack, then vulnerability, because it's using
> >> built-in browsers functionality (and its intended behavior) to attack
> users
> >> of web sites. This attack allows to conduct phishing attacks on users of
> web
> >> sites - in this case phishing is doing not at other (phishing) sites,
> not
> >> with using of holes of target sites (like reflected XSS or persistent
> XSS),
> >> but with using of browsers functionality (and allowed functionality of
> >> target sites to place external content).
> >>
> >> I called this attack as Onsite phishing (or Inline phishing). It can be
> used
> >> (including by phishers) for stealing of logins and passwords of users of
> web
> >> sites.
> >>
> >> As I've tested, a lot of different methods (with using of tags and CSS),
> >> which allow to make cross-site requests, can be used to conduct this
> attack.
> >> Except prefetching (in all Gecko-based browsers which support
> prefetching
> >> functionality), which doesn't show Authentication window at receiving of
> 401
> >> response from web server. The next methods can be used:
> >>
> >> Tags img, script, iframe, frame, embed, link (css) - Mozilla, Firefox,
> IE,
> >> Google Chrome and Opera.
> >> Tag object - Internet Explorer, Google Chrome and Opera.
> >> CSS (inline, in html files, in external css files): such
> >> as -moz-binding:url - Mozilla and Firefox < 3.0, such as
> >> background-image:url - in all browsers.
> >>
> >> Here are screenshots of the attack in different browsers (in Firefox
> 3.0.19,
> >> 3.5.x, 3.6.x. 4.0b2 the dialog window looks almost equally):
> >>
> >> http://websecurity.com.ua/uploads/2011/03/Attack%20on%20Mozilla.png
> >> http://websecurity.com.ua/uploads/2011/03/Attack%20on%20Firefox.png
> >> http://websecurity.com.ua/uploads/2011/03/Attack%20on%20IE6.png
> >> http://websecurity.com.ua/uploads/2011/03/Attack%20on%20IE7.png
> >> http://websecurity.com.ua/uploads/2011/03/Attack%20on%20IE8.png
> >> http://websecurity.com.ua/uploads/2011/03/Attack%20on%20Chrome.png
> >> http://websecurity.com.ua/uploads/2011/03/Attack%20on%20Opera.png
> >>
> >> The attack can be made as reflected at target site, as persistent (with
> >> using of allowed functionality at target site, which allows to put some
> >> tags, like img tag). The persistent attack is more dangerous (and such
> type
> >> of attack is showed on screenshots). And there are millions of web sites
> >> which allow such user generated content (like img tags) which can lead
> to
> >> such persistent attacks.
> >>
> >> ------------
> >> Timeline:
> >> ------------
> >>
> >> 2011.03.26 - announced at my site.
> >> 2011.03.31 - informed Mozilla, Microsoft, Google and Opera.
> >> 2011.04.01 - Mozilla answered and opened entry in Bugzilla
> >> (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=647010).
> >> 2011.04.01 - Microsoft answered and asked for more details.
> >> 2011.04.03 - gave additional details for Microsoft. But they ignored to
> fix,
> >> like Google and Opera did.
> >> 2011.06.14 - Google hiddenly and lamerly fixed this hole in Chrome 12
> beta
> >> (and future versions), without answering and thanking me for informing.
> >> Which is lame behavior and I don't respect companies with such behavior.
> But
> >> this Google's step should force other browsers developers to fix this
> >> vulnerability in their products.
> >
> > FWIW -- no, Chrome Security Team does not operate that way, and you
> > should be well aware of that!
> >
> > In case you weren't, please check out the Hall of Fame:
> > http://dev.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/hall-of-fame
> > As can be seen, we have a long record of working with a variety of
> > excellent researchers, including paying rewards and issuing credit in
> > multiple places.
> >
> > I don't even know what bug you're talking about because you mention a
> > Chrome 13 security features blog post and then (directly above) you're
> > saying we fixed something in Chrome 12.
> >
> > If you provide the Chromium bug URL that you reported this to, I'd be
> > happy to investigate what happened and whether you should be added to
> > any credit page.
> >
> >
> > Cheers
> > Chris
> >
> >> 2011.07.21 - disclosed at my site.
> >>
> >> I mentioned about this vulnerability at my site
> >> (http://websecurity.com.ua/5038/).
> >>
> >> Best wishes & regards,
> >> MustLive
> >> Administrator of Websecurity web site
> >> http://websecurity.com.ua
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
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> >
> > _______________________________________________
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> _______________________________________________
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