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Message-ID: <4E41A097.3030303@si6networks.com>
Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2011 18:03:19 -0300
From: Fernando Gont <fgont@...networks.com>
To: "Dobbins, Roland" <rdobbins@...or.net>
Cc: Fernando Gont <fgont@...kingipv6networks.com>,
	Full Disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>,
	"bugtraq@...urityfocus.com" <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: Re: Hacking IPv6 Networks (slides)

Hi, Roland,

Thanks so much for your e-mail! Please find my comments inline...

On 08/09/2011 03:32 PM, Dobbins, Roland wrote:
> 1.	By prepending lots of extension headers to packets, it may be
> possible to exhaust router ASIC/TCAM capacity, causing the traffic in
> question to be punted to the RP and thus leading to a DoS condition.

Agreed. -- Which makes one wonder a bit about the "stremlined header
blah blah" that one usually hears :-) (ok, it's "streamlined" in a world
in which attackers do not exist :-) )



> 2.	The consonance of the English letters 'B', 'C', 'D', & 'E' is
> likely to result in untold billions of dollars of opex related to
> misconfigurations, outages, improper access policies contributing to
> security breaches, etc.  Whenever possible, IPv6
> address-/netblock-related information should be transmitted in
> written form, not verbally.

Hadn't though aboiut this one. Good grief :-)



> 3.	BGP and IGP mining can also be useful for hinted scanning.

Yes, this would be another one to add to the list of "IPv6 addresses
leaked by application protocols".



> 4.	The numerous instantiations of additional state being added to
> networks in the form of 6-to-4 gateways, CGNs, et. al. as a result of
> IPv4 address exhaustion and IPv6 transition greatly increases the DoS
> risk, as well.

Agreed. At least in the short and near term, NAT usage will only
increase despite of the claims of "return to the e2e internet" (I have
commented a bit about this one in
(http://searchenterprisewan.techtarget.com/tip/Why-IPv6-wont-rid-the-Internet-of-Network-Address-Translation).

-- And it's not just the additional state... it's the increased
complexity of the resulting "system" (the Internet). Even for
troubleshooting it will become more and more painful.



> There's already far too much of this in the
> mobile/wireless world, resulting in numerous DoS conditions on those
> networks caused by portscans/hostscans/outbound & crossbound DDoS
> attacks initiated by botted hosts; now it's going to become even more
> common in the wireline world, as well.

It has been relieving to read your post, I must admit :-) --
particularly when at least half of the stuff that usually gets published
about IPv6 security has to do with how the mandatory-ness of IPsec is
going to save us all. :-)

Thanks!

Best regards,
-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: fgont@...networks.com
web: http://www.si6networks.com



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