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Message-ID: <CAFB=mGARj0K3dy+5DFRu5cKq0Bx1R25YVi62t9O9LjPGvPyKTw@mail.gmail.com> Date: Sat, 27 Aug 2011 05:03:47 +0200 From: "HI-TECH ." <isowarez.isowarez.isowarez@...glemail.com> To: "-= Glowing Sex =-" <doomxd@...il.com> Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, Pat Maechler <Patrick.Maechler@...d.unibas.ch> Subject: Re: Apache Killer Hello Lists, the youtube video at the bottom illustrates the threat quite good. these where the exact same observations I had when initially running the tool. It has to be noted that a good architecture can very likely mitigate the risks. For example load balancing to multiple targets will most likely slow down the tool giving different results than this flat configuration: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3al1lsvFSpA 2011/8/25 -= Glowing Sex =- <doomxd@...il.com>: > Hello list, > Note about the original script/script being used.. > > Just for anyone out there wishing to make this exploit 'useful' , as it > says, this has nothing todo with the 'testapache' used in that code, as this > involves checking on mod_deflate, wich is useless, so instead of that if ($x > = /Partial/) { } > > if($x !~ /^http:\/\//) { > print "[+] Host seems alive..\n"; > return 1; > } else { > return 0; > } > > would then test all your servers, not just checking on those wich have > mod_deflate enabled... i am yet to test the latest 'killer' :S but i will > have a look soon. > thx to everyone for theyre help on this, every fix was put it seems into the > apache advisory, most of the fixes put forth here anyhow, wich is great. > apache.orgh saw this list, and ackowledged it had todo something good, and > they did, much props to them for theyre response on the matter, they have > been class act on this, even tho it should have been patched in 2007 or even > around then,... that is for atleast one hole... one, i guess could been > stopped if the coe had been looked at, improved, wich has happened now, so > thankyou to all who res[ponded on this.. but please be sure to adjust the > script so it just tests a live url. > cheers! > xd > > The advisory i mentioned was also posted already but this, is great work: > > Apache HTTPD Security ADVISORY > ============================== > UPDATE 1 > > Title: Range header DoS vulnerability Apache HTTPD 1.3/2.x > > CVE: CVE-2011-3192 > Last Change: 20110824 1800Z > Date: 20110824 1600Z > Product: Apache HTTPD Web Server > Versions: Apache 1.3 all versions, Apache 2 all versions > > Description: > ============ > > A denial of service vulnerability has been found in the way the multiple > overlapping ranges are handled by the Apache HTTPD server: > > http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2011/Aug/175 > > An attack tool is circulating in the wild. Active use of this tools has > been observed. > > The attack can be done remotely and with a modest number of requests can > cause very significant memory and CPU usage on the server. > > The default Apache HTTPD installation is vulnerable. > > There is currently no patch/new version of Apache HTTPD which fixes this > vulnerability. This advisory will be updated when a long term fix > is available. > > A full fix is expected in the next 48 hours. > > Mitigation: > ============ > > There are several immediate options to mitigate this issue until a full fix > is available: > > 1) Use SetEnvIf or mod_rewrite to detect a large number of ranges and then > either ignore the Range: header or reject the request. > > Option 1: (Apache 2.0 and 2.2) > > # Drop the Range header when more than 5 ranges. > # CVE-2011-3192 > SetEnvIf Range (,.*?){5,} bad-range=1 > RequestHeader unset Range env=bad-range > > # optional logging. > CustomLog logs/range-CVE-2011-3192.log common env=bad-range > > Option 2: (Also for Apache 1.3) > > # Reject request when more than 5 ranges in the Range: header. > # CVE-2011-3192 > # > RewriteEngine on > RewriteCond %{HTTP:range} !(^bytes=[^,]+(,[^,]+){0,4}$|^ > $) > RewriteRule .* - [F] > > The number 5 is arbitrary. Several 10's should not be an issue and may be > required for sites which for example serve PDFs to very high end eReaders > or use things such complex http based video streaming. > > 2) Limit the size of the request field to a few hundred bytes. Note that > while > this keeps the offending Range header short - it may break other headers; > such as sizeable cookies or security fields. > > LimitRequestFieldSize 200 > > Note that as the attack evolves in the field you are likely to have > to further limit this and/or impose other LimitRequestFields limits. > > See: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/mod/core.html#limitrequestfieldsize > > 3) Use mod_headers to completely dis-allow the use of Range headers: > > RequestHeader unset Range > > Note that this may break certain clients - such as those used for > e-Readers and progressive/http-streaming video. > > 4) Deploy a Range header count module as a temporary stopgap measure: > > http://people.apache.org/~dirkx/mod_rangecnt.c > > Precompiled binaries for some platforms are available at: > > http://people.apache.org/~dirkx/BINARIES.txt > > 5) Apply any of the current patches under discussion - such as: > > > http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/httpd-dev/201108.mbox/%3cCAAPSnn2PO-d-C4nQt_TES2RRWiZr7urefhTKPWBC1b+K1Dqc7g@mail.gmail.com%3e > > OS and Vendor specific information > ================================== > > Red Hat: Option 1 cannot be used on Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4. > https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=732928 > > NetWare: Pre compiled binaries available. > > Actions: > ======== > > Apache HTTPD users who are concerned about a DoS attack against their server > should consider implementing any of the above mitigations immediately. > > When using a third party attack tool to verify vulnerability - know that > most > of the versions in the wild currently check for the presence of mod_deflate; > and will (mis)report that your server is not vulnerable if this module is > not > present. This vulnerability is not dependent on presence or absence of > that module. > > Planning: > ========= > > This advisory will be updated when new information, a patch or a new release > is available. A patch or new apache release for Apache 2.0 and 2.2 is > expected > in the next 48 hours. Note that, while popular, Apache 1.3 is deprecated. > > ...it took into account the public,and altho the fixes could have been > credited, it is a great advisory, and very good on respnding to the issue, > albeit late. > xd > > > > On 25 August 2011 03:07, Pat Maechler <Patrick.Maechler@...d.unibas.ch> > wrote: >> >> Does this fix work as well if I put it in httpd.conf instead? >> I'm no Apache/RewriteEngine crack, but I know that there are some >> differences with the rewrite engine if you put it into httpd.conf >> instead of .htaccess (and I have currently no possibility to do a safe >> test) :-/ >> >> Reply to >> > From: Davide Guerri <davide.guerri () gmail com> >> > Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2011 10:03:03 +0200 >> >> RewriteEngine On >> >> RewriteCond %{REQUEST_METHOD} ^(HEAD|GET) [NC] >> >> RewriteCond %{HTTP:Range} ([0-9]*-[0-9]*)(\s*,\s*[0-9]*-[0-9]*)+ >> >> RewriteRule .* - [F] >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >> This message was sent using IMP, the Internet Messaging Program. >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. >> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html >> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ > > _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. 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