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Message-ID: <4EDCFFB9.8000808@propergander.org.uk>
Date: Mon, 05 Dec 2011 17:30:33 +0000
From: Dave <mrx@...pergander.org.uk>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: one of my servers has been compromized

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On 05/12/2011 10:44, Lucio Crusca wrote:
> Hello *,
> 
> I'm not new here, but I've mostly lurked all the time through gmane. I never 
> believed it could happen to me until it actually happened: they compromized 
> one of my servers. It's a Ubuntu 10.04 server with all security patches 
> regularly applied. I'm inclined to believe they used some hole in the web 
> application, which is a old customized Virtuemart version (1.1.3), which is 
> not upgradable because of the invasive code customizations (I'm not the 
> author of that code, so I have no clue about what had been changed back 
> then).
> 
> Now the problem for me is to track down the security hole. Here is the email 
> my provider received and forwarded to me:
> 
>> Subject: ISP Report; botnet activity on irc.undernet.org
>> [...]
>>  
>> Hello, I am an operator on the irc chat network, 
>> irc.undernet.org and i would like you to investigate the 
>> owner of the Ip addresses that are listed at the foot of this 
>> email.
>>  
>> This/These host(s) have likely been compromised, and had an
>> altered/rogue process installed on it, and was part of a botnet
>> that was found on our network. 
>>  
>> The exploit or compromise running on this system is likely 
>> to be an irc bot. Can you please alert the person who is 
>> responsible, for its security to patch/upgrade, remove the 
>> irc process and secure their system.
>>  
>> = Unix System owners = 
>> A favourite place for hiding the bot(s) is in tmp 
>> and in /var/tmp/ or /dev/shm/ or in a users home directory
>> sometimes it may be hidden like /tmp/".  ."/ or similar.
>>  
>> The bot files can usually be found by running these one line 
>> commands as the root user.
>>  
>> find / -exec grep -l "undernet" {} +
>> find / -exec grep -l "sybnc" {} +
>> find / -name "*.set" | perl -pe 's/.\/\w+-(\w+)-.*/$1/' | sort | uniq
>> find / -name "inst" | perl -pe 's/.\/\w+-(\w+)-.*/$1/' | sort | uniq
>>  
>> netstat -tanp
>> lsof -i tcp:<Port number>
>>  
>> *netstat looking for connections to remote port 6667 or the 
>> range of ports between 6660-7000 once you find the port you 
>> can use the command, lsof -i tcp:portnumber to determine
>> which process/user it is running under, and terminate it. 
>>  
>> = Windows System Owners = 
>> most windows bots are mIRC scripted bots and generally 
>> need a file called mirc.ini to run, you should search for 
>> this file. Run a good antivirus scanner and firewall.
>>  
>> This Ip/host may be removed from our Irc network due to the
>> risks it presents to our users.
>>  
>> Should you need any help with removing the files or bot
>> process, feel free to contact me by mail or on our network,
>> which you connect to using any irc client and issuing
>> /server irc.undernet.org
>>  
>> I look forward to your reply
>> Scot
>>  
>> * Affected host/IPs, capture time is GMT+1: United kingdom
>> and servers they were connected to.
>>  
>> Please note: when resolving server names to IP Addresses
>> that all our servers end with .undernet.org (for example)
>> Tampa.FL.US. is actually  Tampa.FL.US.undernet.org 
>>  
>> Important: If you reply to this mail needing further
>> information, please leave this mail intact, or supply us 
>> with the IP Address(es) in question, as we reference these 
>> mails by the unique IP Address
>>  
>> Time of Capture: DECEMBER 3, 2011 10:03:48 PM
>>  
>> List of IP address(es) and server it connected to:
>> my.server.ip.address (CHICAGO.IL.US
>>  
>> BUDAPEST.HU.EU
>>  
>> MONTREAL.QC.CA.undernet.org)
>>  
> 
> I've run the "find" commands and found a number of file with the first 
> "find", under /tmp/.m
> 
> Deleted them, looked up remote connections with netstat, killed perl 
> processes that where trying to connect to port 6959 (only trying because 
> I've now set up iptables so that they actually can't), but those processes 
> kept spawning. Checked crontab of www-data, found the launcher, removed it.
> 
> Now the problem is: how do I pervent further abuse? What should I search in 
> the logs (if anything) to spot the security hole?
> 
> TIA
> Lucio.

Much of what can be done to secure your server has been mentioned in the replies.

I would just like to add this:
You may want to consider running a rootkit check as a daily cron job and having the results emailed to you.
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