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Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2011 11:09:46 -0300
From: Pablo Ximenes <pablo@...en.es>
To: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@...il.com>
Cc: full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: OMIGOD CIQ HACKING THE WORLD.

Hi,

2011/12/7 Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@...il.com>

> And I was really hoping I wouldn't get dragged into another discussion
> on this...
>

Well, if it serves of any consolation, discussions are good for making
things more clear, I´d assume. Sorry, though.



>  On Wed, Dec 7, 2011 at 7:55 AM, Pablo Ximenes <pablo@...en.es> wrote:
> > Hi All,
> >
> > Based on what I read from the post, basically Rosenberg recognises he
> has no
> > clue about what happens with the rest of affected phone models:
> >
> > "One important thing to note is that this represents the metrics that are
> > submitted to the CarrierIQ application by the code written by Samsung.
> The
> > list of available metrics are carrier specific, but will remain constant
> on
> > a given handset model. The subset of this data that is actually recorded
> and
> > collected is at the discretion of the carrier, and is based on the
> profile
> > installed on the device." (Dan Rosenberg)
> >
> >
> > So the eavesdropped data with respect to the rest of affected phones
> could
> > be anything for all he knows, including contents of SMS's and visited
> pages.
> >
>
> This is not accurate.  I have not enumerated the locations on every
> phone where OEMs have modified the Android framework to submit metrics
> to the CarrierIQ agent running on the phone.  This means I don't know
> what subset of metrics that CIQ supports is actually being submitted
> to the agent on every phone.  However, I have reverse engineered the
> actual CarrierIQ binaries on a wide variety of phones (the agent code
> is actually fairly similar across the board), so I have a very good
> idea of the total set of supported metrics (regardless of what's
> actually being submitted) looks like.  And surprise, there is no
> metric that contains fields for SMS bodies or web page contents.
>
>
Glad you made yourself more clear this time. :) Suggestion: why don´t you
publish the full set of metrics found on your investigation? That would
make your research report even more complete.


> Food for thought: why would a carrier double their bandwidth
> utilization for SMS in order to violate federal wiretapping law and
> get a second copy of the text message *that they already have*?
>
>  Good point! But that´s not the case for encrypted HTTP data, though.


>  > And about collecting every URL (even https ones) that is visited. Forget
> > about the legality, let's go directly to the privacy implications.
> > For instance, if you do that for a simple Facebook session, there's a
> huge
> > amount of very private information being collected (fixed URLS that
> reveal
> > photos, etc;  ajax URLs that reveal juicy IDs, among other things).
> Also, I
> > don't think anybody would want to have their complete web history in the
> > hands of anyone without their express consent.
> >
>
> Agreed.  It will be interesting to see whether or not this information
> is actually being collected, since I've only shown that it's
> *possible* for it to be collected, not that it actually is.
>
> > Going back to the legality, even if the URL is just the begining of an
> HTTP
> > negotiation process, it doesn't mean that URLs are not payloads legally.
> In
> > many countries only layers 4 (transport) and bellow (TCP info, IP data,
> etc)
> > would be considered header information and all the rest would be
> considered
> > payload, incluing the URL. If what Rosenberg claims is that a URL is not
> > considered payload to the law, I thing he might have to review his
> concepts.
> > In Brazil, for instance, capturing the URL alone in this scenario would
> > constitute a crime of illegal wiretapping.
> >
>
> I never made this claim.  I explicitly state that the legality of this
> needs to be investigated, since to my knowledge, it's an open legal
> question in the United States.
>
>
Well, it wasn´t clear to me, that´s why I used a "IF"  when questioning
your claims. Maybe I should have made it Bigger. :)

Since we are on that, there´s one question I think you could answer. Are
URLs content or header information in your opinion? (kind of the main point
I was raising doubts about)


Regards,
> Dan
>
>

Regards,

Pablo Ximenes


>  >
> > Regards,
> >
> > Pablo Ximenes
> >
> > 2011/12/6 Christian Sciberras <uuf6429@...il.com>
> >>
> >> Or not...
> >>
> >> http://vulnfactory.org/blog/2011/12/05/carrieriq-the-real-story/
> >>
> >> On the other hand, where that l33t hacker Drew (aka xD 0x41)?
> >> Thought he'd enlighten us with more of his awesome hacking powers on
> this
> >> issue.
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
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> >
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