Message-ID: <CALCvwp4foyyhosEf2yNQxo6o9H8nsimpb84Qwj7J3PmSi+qrAg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2011 10:59:45 +1100
From: GloW - XD <doomxd@...il.com>
To: "HI-TECH ." <isowarez.isowarez.isowarez@...glemail.com>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Fwd: VSFTPD Remote Heap Overrun (low severity)

http://dividead.wordpress.com/tag/heap-overflow/


oh wow, amazing, someone has already posted but, anyhow, the things
explained, here...and yes, if it overflows then ofc it can lead to
possible root....

fucuall fd
/XD


On 10 December 2011 10:47, HI-TECH .
<isowarez.isowarez.isowarez@...glemail.com> wrote:
> ---------- Weitergeleitete Nachricht ----------
> Von: HI-TECH . <isowarez.isowarez.isowarez@...glemail.com>
> Datum: 10. Dezember 2011 00:44
> Betreff: Re: [Full-disclosure] VSFTPD Remote Heap Overrun (low severity)
> An: Ramon de C Valle <rcvalle@...hat.com>
>
>
> Hi Ramon,
> Frankly I didn't look into the possibility to exploit this vulnerability,
> so i do not know if it is easy or hard to exploit. As you outlined
> it is difficult, during your audit you did not manage to trigger a
> function pointer call? :> i guess not
> I am not much into exploiting heap based overruns in the old times fashion.
> BTW both freebsd and pure-ftpd load locale files (strace it and you
> will see) from /usr,
> these locale files are used for the ftp responses to make them written
> in international language.
> FreeBSD ftpd in junction with the locale files loading will SIGSEGV
> (EIP overwrite)
> due to a strcpy in locale responses in a special codepath. I did not
> find a way to exploit Pure-FTPD through this
> locale loading tough, because Pure-FTPD is very restrictive in many ways even
> on response lines but there might be a vuln there too. (I dont
> remember if locale loading was only
> on FreeBSD or also on Linux or also in vsftpd, since the libc behaves
> very different in BSD/glibc/eglibc etc)
>
> Regards,
>
> Kingcope
>
>
> Am 9. Dezember 2011 19:32 schrieb Ramon de C Valle <rcvalle@...hat.com>:
>>> This is afaik a patched CVE in Linux glibc [1] which can be triggered through
>>> the very secure ftp daemon [2] so it will only work on older linux distros.
>>> Be aware that vsftpd has privilege seperation built in so this bug
>>> will not yield a root shell.
>>> It could yield root only in junction with a linux kernel vulnerability
>>> because the attacker
>>> will not be able to break the chroot without being root.
>>> This bug has a low severity because it's hard to exploit.
>>> Linux systems without patched glibc are vulnerable even if the latest
>>> version vsftpd-2.3.4 is installed.
>>> The bug is in the glibc timezone code. vsftpd loads timezone files
>>> from /usr [3]. If the attacker is inside a chroot
>>> he can easily create this directory and the timezone file and trigger
>>> the heap overrun.
>>>
>>> A Debugging Session illustrating the bug can be found on youtube:
>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KRCuozBM_dQ
>> I did a brief analysis of this issue. And it seems vsftpd does not add anything to this as an attack vector. Althought we can control the size of the chunk to be allocated (i.e. transitions), and can arbitrarily allocate this chunk from fast bins, the main arena, or eventually, a new mmap()'ed heap. We do not have any control over when its adjacent chunks are allocated, freed, the type of their contents, when they will be used, how they will be used, and if they will be used and useful at all. In addition, the data used to overflow (i.e. transition times) are read and decoded as 4-byte integers in network (big-endian) byte order, which increases the difficulty in faking any structure, such as the adjacent allocated chunk to, at least, get outside of glibc scope after the overflow--since all return paths from __tzfile_read frees our controlled previously allocated chunk.
>>
>> Do you or anyone know a way to potentially exploit this vulnerability?
>>
>>>
>>> Cheers!
>> Thanks,
>>
>>>
>>>[1] http://dividead.wordpress.com/tag/heap-overflow/
>>>[2] https://security.appspot.com/vsftpd.html
>>>[3] For example /usr/share/zoneinfo/UTC-01:00
>>>
>>>/Kingcope
>>
>>
>> --
>> Ramon de C Valle / Red Hat Security Response Team
>
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