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Message-ID: <CALCvwp7dt-v5fzLq9GXmWpGqUkwtcGy-sa12cvVSsSEikXduog@mail.gmail.com> Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2011 10:25:41 +1100 From: xD 0x41 <secn3t@...il.com> To: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@...edump.cx> Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk Subject: Re: silly PoCs continue: X-Frame-Options give you less than expected Its awesome ... and works, but, yes conditions must be met for firefox8 still... this is 2011 ;s almost 12! this is, i guess a great PoC and info but, only some ppl realise the potentiall to this.... anyhow, thanks Mike,thats a GREAT job mate :) /xd On 11 December 2011 09:39, Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@...edump.cx> wrote: > At the risk of annoying everyone... > > I think we greatly underappreciate the extent to which JavaScript > allows you to exploit the limits of human perception. On modern > high-performance systems, windows can be opened, positioned, and > closed; and documents loaded and then navigated away from; so quickly > that we can't even reliably notice that, let alone react consciously. > > The PoC I posted here earlier this week > (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/switch/) demonstrates one example of page > transitions occurring so fast that you don't register it; and some of > my earlier posts outlined the exploitation of page switching to > exploit browser UIs (e.g. http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/ffgeo2/). Today, > I wanted to share this brief demonstration of an attack that should > hopefully illustrate why our current way of thinking about > clickjacking (and the possible defenses, such as X-Frame-Options) is > flawed: > > http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/clickit/ > > The basic idea here is that instead of placing the UI you want to > tamper with in an invisible or only partly-visible <iframe>, you can > achieve a similar effect simply by predicting the time of a > premeditated click (which is fairly easy if you look at mouse velocity > and distance to the expected destination), and then either destroying > the current window, or navigating to a different document (in this > case, a cheesy banking site). > > While everything about this exploit is extremely goofy, and I put no > effort into making the transitions less obvious, it should still > demonstrate the issue neatly. > > /mz > > _______________________________________________ > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
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