full-disclosure - Re: silly PoCs continue: X-Frame-Options give you less than expected

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Message-ID: <CALCvwp7dt-v5fzLq9GXmWpGqUkwtcGy-sa12cvVSsSEikXduog@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2011 10:25:41 +1100
From: xD 0x41 <secn3t@...il.com>
To: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@...edump.cx>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: silly PoCs continue: X-Frame-Options give you
 less than expected

Its awesome ... and works, but, yes conditions must be met for
firefox8 still... this is 2011 ;s almost 12!
this is, i guess a great PoC and info but, only some ppl realise the
potentiall to this....
anyhow, thanks Mike,thats a GREAT job mate :)
/xd


On 11 December 2011 09:39, Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@...edump.cx> wrote:
> At the risk of annoying everyone...
>
> I think we greatly underappreciate the extent to which JavaScript
> allows you to exploit the limits of human perception. On modern
> high-performance systems, windows can be opened, positioned, and
> closed; and documents loaded and then navigated away from; so quickly
> that we can't even reliably notice that, let alone react consciously.
>
> The PoC I posted here earlier this week
> (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/switch/) demonstrates one example of page
> transitions occurring so fast that you don't register it; and some of
> my earlier posts outlined the exploitation of page switching to
> exploit browser UIs (e.g. http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/ffgeo2/). Today,
> I wanted to share this brief demonstration of an attack that should
> hopefully illustrate why our current way of thinking about
> clickjacking (and the possible defenses, such as X-Frame-Options) is
> flawed:
>
> http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/clickit/
>
> The basic idea here is that instead of placing the UI you want to
> tamper with in an invisible or only partly-visible <iframe>, you can
> achieve a similar effect simply by predicting the time of a
> premeditated click (which is fairly easy if you look at mouse velocity
> and distance to the expected destination), and then either destroying
> the current window, or navigating to a different document (in this
> case, a cheesy banking site).
>
> While everything about this exploit is extremely goofy, and I put no
> effort into making the transitions less obvious, it should still
> demonstrate the issue neatly.
>
> /mz
>
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