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Message-ID: <40067a31-eb88-47b1-97d5-abc44dbffe92@zmail15.collab.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 19:19:20 -0500 (EST)
From: Ramon de C Valle <rcvalle@...hat.com>
To: Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu>
Cc: isowarez isowarez isowarez <isowarez.isowarez.isowarez@...glemail.com>,
dwalsh@...hat.com, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Fwd: VSFTPD Remote Heap Overrun (low severity)
> If you're trying to do it with SELinux policy, that would require
> opening the
> locale file before the chroot, then changing the selinux context to
> something
> that can't open locale_t and then doing the chroot. Unfortunately,
> that's fast
> approaching "cure is worse than the disease", because it means the
> initial
> context has to have the ability to change its context (in the
> standard selinux
> policy, that's restricted to only 2 or 3 binaries like 'newrole').
Actually, this is has no relation with binaries. Transitions are defined per domain in SELinux policy. For additional information, refer to:
http://danwalsh.livejournal.com/23944.html
>
> We're lucky nobody has looked into what should happen on an
> MLS-enabled system :)
I don't think sensitivity levels would make any difference in this case in the current SELinux MLS policy.
--
Ramon de C Valle / Red Hat Security Response Team
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