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Message-Id: <151BE9B3-0B50-4AA4-8F02-D22177AB66E5@doxpara.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Dec 2011 13:03:00 +0100
From: Dan Kaminsky <dan@...para.com>
To: Gage Bystrom <themadichib0d@...il.com>
Cc: "full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: WiFi Protected Setup attack code posted
WPS could have been fine, in that it would have forced an online attack that took an infeasible amount of time.
It just didn't accomplish that.
My thinking is that they'll get this property back into WPS with some sort of blinding of the half-break state, but I haven't dug into the vuln enough to be sure.
Sent from my iPhone
On Dec 29, 2011, at 11:38 AM, Gage Bystrom <themadichib0d@...il.com> wrote:
> Is be surprised if anyone related to security actually thought WPS was remotely safe, bout time some actually released a public tool to brute it though :P
>
> On Dec 29, 2011 2:02 AM, "Craig Heffner" <cheffner@...ttys0.com> wrote:
> Yesterday, Stefan published a paper describing a vulnerability in WPS that allows attackers to recover WPA/WPA2 keys in a matter of hours (http://sviehb.wordpress.com/2011/12/27/wi-fi-protected-setup-pin-brute-force-vulnerability/).
>
> Code has been posted to implement the attack: http://www.tacnetsol.com/news/2011/12/28/cracking-wifi-protected-setup-with-reaver.html
>
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