full-disclosure - Re: Iran is doing ip-and-port filtering of SSL

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Message-ID: <CAPdaGT7tYh6cn37EVS4Bi-mn4zV7Kz1K85cL3UO9Raehj1HDmg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2012 20:44:06 -0500
From: Sai <sai@...zai.com>
To: full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Iran is doing ip-and-port filtering of SSL

See my post @ https://plus.google.com/u/0/103112149634414554669/posts/PT3eEF4u415
to stay updated. Copying over update:

-

Further testing done. Conclusions:

1. IP-and-port filtering for some IPs
2. SSL protocol filtering on standard ports for targeted IPs / sites
3. No request header filtering
4. Some IPs / sites NOT SSL protocol or port filtered!
5. All Tor filtered, even unpublished proxies

I'm not going to openly publish what went through to prevent it
getting blacklisted and useless for testing, but it was a full normal
https://something:443 connection, green lock w/ verified serial # and
all.

The government proxy is http://bgp.he.net/AS12880
Still to test, will update post:
* obfs2 tor
* ssh on standard & nonstandard ports
* nonstandard ssl ports

More info:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/iran-partially-blocks-encrypted-network-traffic
(based in part on my info)
http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3575029

On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 at 19:54, Sai <sai@...zai.com> wrote:
> I have pretty definitive proof that Iran is doing ip-and-port based
> filtering of SSL.
>
> Filtering is being done by 217.218.154.250 after a hop through
> 217.219.96.120 / 217.219.96.132. This hop is after my source's ISP,
> and all three IPs are owned by ITC, Iran's central telco.
>
> Filtering targets all google.com IPs, some but not all torproject.org
> IPs, probably more. Haven't attempted a broad scan. It's a simple
> connection drop; filtered connections just time out.
>
> It is not based on SSL handshake signature; testing SSL on nonstandard
> ports worked successfully, and testing non-SSL on :443 of target IPs
> was blocked.
>
> I'm not sharing screencaps in order to protect my source, but tests
> included TCP traceroutes on different IP/port combinations and some
> simple use of curl.
>
> Cheers,
> Sai

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