full-disclosure - Re: Downloads Folder: A Binary Planting Minefield

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Message-ID: <CANtF8NAMsqNL33Csov-47uD28iuYoFcC6mrOhjx+-8D3DisJzA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2012 16:50:46 -0600
From: Grandma Eubanks <tborland1@...il.com>
To: Sanguinarious Rose <SanguineRose@...ultusterra.com>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Downloads Folder: A Binary Planting Minefield

Malware has been using it to spread through local shares and also using it
as easy privilege escalations for known trusted software. Like I said and
have always said, the vectors are going to be local and for further
compromise.

On Mon, Feb 20, 2012 at 4:22 PM, Sanguinarious Rose <
SanguineRose@...ultusterra.com> wrote:

> On Mon, Feb 20, 2012 at 2:28 PM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader@...il.com>
> wrote:
> > Hi Mitja,
> >
> > On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 11:32 AM, ACROS Security Lists <lists@...os.si>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> This blog post reveals a bit of our research and provides an advance
> notification of
> >> a largely unknown remote exploit technique on Windows. More
> importantly, it provides
> >> instructions for protecting your computers from this technique while
> waiting for the
> >> affected software to correct its behavior.
> >>
> >>
> http://blog.acrossecurity.com/2012/02/downloads-folder-binary-planting.html
> >
> > $ Look for the presence of any *.dll files in the Downloads
> > $ folder and do the same as in the previous step.
> > $ Delete all files from the Downloads folder.
> > I don't believe a PE/PE+ executable needs a DLL extension to be loaded
> > by LoadLibrary and friends.
> >
>
> They do not need a specific extension for LoadLibrary() to work.
>
> This is more having to do with dll search paths which has been a known
> exploit vector for a long while now. I do know Win7 fixes this by just
> not checking the local directories when it loads a .exe, I am unsure
> if Vista does the same, and I am positive WinXP checks local
> directories first since I've done so under WinXP.
>
> They might have something interesting with the msiexec.exe with it
> checking the local directory first. I would call this a programming
> issue by the installer not specifying a full path and no validations.
>
> If a dev was really concerned when they called LoadLibrary() they
> could just use SetDllDirectory(), GetDllDirectory(), and friends to
> manipulate where they look for dlls.
>
> Since I responded to something in this subject, I would like to share
> my personal opinion this doesn't really seem like a major exploit
> vector. It appears to fall to usual do and do not of basic security.
> Obviously downloading files from a suspect website is a security risk.
>
> > Perhaps a scanning/cleansing tool would be helpful.
> >
> > Jeff
> >
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