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Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2012 20:50:54 +0200
From: Georgi Guninski <guninski@...inski.com>
To: coderman <coderman@...il.com>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk, Ramo <ramo@...dvikings.com>
Subject: Re: RSA and random number generation

On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 09:38:33AM -0800, coderman wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 2:09 PM, Ramo <ramo@...dvikings.com> wrote:
> > I'll just leave this here.....
> >
> > http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/064.pdf
> 
> anyone who cares about proper key generation uses a hardware entropy
> source. they put them in CPUs, they provide them on motherboards. they
> make them very high throughput so your /dev/urandom will never block
> no matter what the task.
> 
> hwrandom -> egd -> /dev/[u]random always filled at boot and ever
> after... SOLVED.
> 
> anything less is asking for failure.
>

if i understood the paper correctly they broke some rsa keys because
they shared a prime $p$ (the rsa keys are different, shared rsa
keys might be explained by the debian random fiasco or the like bugs).

i would suspect it is quite unlikely entropy/seed to explain the above
scenario - the odds appear small to me.

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