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Message-ID: <27B5828F-BC02-4150-A7C6-92D9D480E007@hammerofgod.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2012 21:46:37 +0000
From: "Thor (Hammer of God)" <thor@...merofgod.com>
To: Georgi Guninski <guninski@...inski.com>
Cc: "full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Using second gpg keyring may be misleading?

Ah...  Very interesting.  Another example where "default trust" can be a bad thing (as we saw with Flame).

Sent from my iPad

On Jun 15, 2012, at 6:43 AM, "Georgi Guninski" <guninski@...inski.com> wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 05:52:26PM +0000, Thor (Hammer of God) wrote:
>> What are you considering exploitable?  The untrusted/unverified "Master" key?
>> 
> 
> ubuntu fixed this out of paranoia:
> https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/ubuntu-security-announce/2012-June/001721.html
> 
>> While it appears that a man-in-the-middle attacker cannot
>> exploit this, as a hardening measure this update adjusts apt-key to
>> validate all subkeys when checking for key collisions.
> 
> i would suppose this was exploitable while it was alive.
> 
> 

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