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Message-ID: <04F9AFDCA6560B42B91DB1A429B7D0DE02F99D26@G1W3778.americas.hpqcorp.net>
Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2012 17:11:21 +0000
From: ZDI Disclosures <zdi-disclosures@...pingpoint.com>
To: "'full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk'" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>, 
	"'bugtraq@...urityfocus.com'" <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Cc: ZDI Disclosures <zdi-disclosures@...com>
Subject: ZDI-12-119: EMC AutoStart ftAgent Opcode 0x41
 Subcode 0x00 Parsing Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

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ZDI-12-119: EMC AutoStart ftAgent Opcode 0x41 Subcode 0x00 Parsing Remote
Code Execution Vulnerability
http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-12-119
July 12, 2012

- -- CVE ID:
CVE-2012-0409

- -- CVSS:
10, AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

- -- Affected Vendors:
EMC

- -- Affected Products:
EMC AutoStart


- -- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability by Digital Vaccine protection filter ID 12435.
For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS, visit:

    http://www.tippingpoint.com

- -- Vulnerability Details:
This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of EMC Autostart. Authentication is not required
to exploit this vulnerability.

The specific flaw exists within the ftAgent.exe service, which listens by
default on TCP port 8045. When handling messages with opcode 65 (0x41) and
subcode 00, the vulnerable function uses a uninitialized stack variable in
calculating a memory pointer. Also, the function uses signed extension and
signed comparison when checking the uninitialized stack variable, which
allows arbitrary negative values to bypass the check. This could result in
corruption of a controlled memory location, which can be leveraged to
execute code under the context of the SYSTEM user.


- -- Vendor Response:
EMC has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More details can be
found at:
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/522835/30/0/threaded


- -- Disclosure Timeline:
2011-12-22 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2012-07-12 - Coordinated public release of advisory


- -- Credit:
This vulnerability was discovered by:
* gwslabs.com


- -- About the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI):
Established by TippingPoint, The Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) represents 
a best-of-breed model for rewarding security researchers for responsibly
disclosing discovered vulnerabilities.

Researchers interested in getting paid for their security research
through the ZDI can find more information and sign-up at:

    http://www.zerodayinitiative.com

The ZDI is unique in how the acquired vulnerability information is
used. TippingPoint does not re-sell the vulnerability details or any
exploit code. Instead, upon notifying the affected product vendor,
TippingPoint provides its customers with zero day protection through
its intrusion prevention technology. Explicit details regarding the
specifics of the vulnerability are not exposed to any parties until
an official vendor patch is publicly available. Furthermore, with the
altruistic aim of helping to secure a broader user base, TippingPoint
provides this vulnerability information confidentially to security
vendors (including competitors) who have a vulnerability protection or
mitigation product.

Our vulnerability disclosure policy is available online at:
    http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/disclosure_policy/

Follow the ZDI on Twitter:
    http://twitter.com/thezdi

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