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Message-ID: <CAMZ4ocuj2kghsNd=g8uEcdkYogxHGT1oxDOZvn7Q-z7y2GKAaQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Aug 2012 10:30:19 -0300
From: Pablo Ximenes <pablo@...en.es>
To: andfarm <andfarm@...il.com>
Cc: full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re:
Security Problem with Google’s 2-Step Authentication
Hi,
On Mon, Jul 30, 2012 at 1:46 PM, andfarm <andfarm@...il.com> wrote:
>
> Invalidating the entire window would make you unable to authenticate
> using OTP more than once every 10 minutes.
You´re right, it would have a hard impact on usability. Maybe just
invalidating closeby tokens would do, like the 2 or 3 next ones.
> In any case, I'm having a hard time imagining what sort of threat model
> which make this necessary -- if you can somehow predict a user's OTP code
> for some point in the future, you could go ahead and predict one that's
> even further in the future (outside the window of invalidated keys), and
> use it when that time arrives.
>
I don´t know if it answers your question, but have you got the chance to
examine my PoC? http://ximen.es/gmail
It´s a phishing verion of accounts.google.com that steals two OTP
passwords and gets you authenticated with one of them while it "saves"
the other in a usable state (it issues an error message in order to trick
the user into entering the code again). This way, the user is lead to think
all the 2 codes entered were invalidated because of the successful login,
which is obviously not the case in the PoC. If the "invalidate the next X
tokens" approach were in place, this threat wouldn´t be possible.
Regards,
Pablo
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