full-disclosure - Re: Authentication flaw in APS-Soft DTE Axiom (CVE-2012-2455)

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Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2012 22:38:11 +0200
From: Tomas Rzepka <tomas@...tezza.net>
To: "full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Authentication flaw in APS-Soft DTE
	Axiom	(CVE-2012-2455)

Hello list,

It has come to my attention that this vulnerability disclosure has been misinterpreted by some.  12.3.3 is NOT affected by this vulnerability!

Best regards,
Tomas Rzepka

-----Original Message-----
From: full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk [mailto:full-disclosure-bounces@...ts.grok.org.uk] On Behalf Of Tomas Rzepka
Sent: den 6 september 2012 16:56
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: [Full-disclosure] Authentication flaw in APS-Soft DTE Axiom (CVE-2012-2455)

Release date: 2012-09-06
Discovered by: Tomas Rzepka, Certezza AB, http://www.certezza.net
Vendor: Advanced Productivity Software (http://www.aps-soft.com) Versions Affected: Versions prior 12.3.3
Type: Authentication
Severity: High
CVSS Base Score: 8.5 (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:P/A:N)
CVE: CVE-2012-2455

----------------
Description
----------------
In a penetration test we discovered a security flaw in DTE Axiom Mobile Solution.
The security vulnerability can cause customers loss of sensitive data, such as usernames, customer relations and projects.

Advanced Productivity Software DTE Axiom has a server application that can be published on the Internet to give users of iPhone/iPad and Black Berry access to the time tracking system. User is deployed by enabling the feature on each user in the backend administration. The user gets an e-mail from the system which contains two links. One link to download the application (from Apple AppStore). The other link is to feed the smart phone application with configuration such as server address, username, database and registration ID (GUID). The application communicates with the server over HTTPS.

Although the application has a registration ID to identify each device it is never used. By posting applicable HTTP parameters to the application server, anyone with knowledge how the application works can extract and alter information about users, customers, projects, etc., without being authenticated to the server. We only had access to an iPhone/iPad device so we could not test the Black Berry functionality and it does not use the same API. The security issue does not exist in the Black Berry API according to the vendor.

----------------
Mitigation
----------------
Vendor has released a new version (12.3.3) which fixes this specific issue.

----------------
Timeline
----------------
2012-05-07: Vendor disclosures
2012-05-07: Vendor response
2012-09-04: Fix released
2012-09-06: Public disclosure

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_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/