full-disclosure - Backupbuddy wordpress plugin - sensitive data exposure in importbuddy.php

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Date: Sun, 24 Mar 2013 10:51:54 +1300
From: Rob Armstrong <robarmstrong.te71@...il.com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Backupbuddy wordpress plugin - sensitive data
	exposure in importbuddy.php

#
#
# Backupbuddy - sensitive data exposure in importbuddy.php
#
# "the premiere WordPress backup plugin to backup, restore and move
WordPress"
# http://ithemes.com/purchase/backupbuddy/
#
# known versions affected: v1.3.4, v2.1.4, v2.2.25, v2.2.28, v2.2.4, likely
other versions also
#
# impact:
#       access to wordpress site and sql backups
#       disclosure of server configuration information
#
# author: robarmstrong.te71@...il.com

# summary

The final step in the importbuddy backup restoration process is supposed to
remove importbuddy.php from the root of the site, however this step often
fails (most commonly as a result of filesystem permissions) allowing an
attacker access to some or all of the functions and information provided by
importbuddy.php.

An access password for importbuddy does not appear to be a mandatory
requirement. Forcing the user to set a password (and fixing the
authentication bypass) would go some way to mitigating the risk of
importbuddy.php not being deleted.

# details

The name of the backup file contains a random string intended to prevent an
attacker from guessing its value.
However if backup files are present, browsing to
http://site/importbuddy.phpwill expose their filenames; these can then
be used to download the files
from the site:

        <select name="file" style="max-width: 590px;">
                <option
value="backup-zipfile-date-randomstring.zip">backup-zipfile-date-randomstring.zip</option>
        </select>

The desired backup file can be retrieved with: wget
http://site/backup-zipfile-date-randomstring.zip

The backup consists of a zip archive containing the wordpress directory,
complete with wp-config.php and often a .sql dump containing a full copy of
the wordpress database and any other databases the backupbuddy plugin has
been configured to include.

Importbuddy also presents the option to upload a backup on step 1 of the
restoration process, potentially allowing defacement or deletion and also
trojanning the site if an existing backup is available.

Additionally there are issues affecting the 'step' query string field. This
has a differing impact depending on the version of Backupbuddy targeted:

        http://site/importbuddy.php?step=1

 - Can be used to avoid the password check on step 1 (if a password has
been set) by passing ?step=[2-7]
 - Steps 2 and 3 expose the full path of the wordpress install
 - Skipping to step 7 has the potential to erase the wordpress install
(only known to affect v2.2.4)
 - Accessing http://site/importbuddy.php?step=0&action=phpinfo provides
phpinfo information (confirmed on v2.2.25)

Content of type "text/html" skipped

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