full-disclosure - Re: VUPEN Security Research - Adobe Flash Player RTMP Data Processing Object Confusion (CVE-2013-2555)

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Message-ID: <20130420233402.GB11265@neo.hsd1.nh.comcast.net>
Date: Sat, 20 Apr 2013 19:34:02 -0400
From: Bryan <bryan@...wildhats.com>
To: Benji <me@...ji.com>
Cc: Full-Disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: VUPEN Security Research - Adobe Flash Player
 RTMP Data Processing Object Confusion (CVE-2013-2555)

"Your 5-chained-0day-to-code-exec, in my opinion, does not count as 
negligence  and comes from the developer effectively not being a 
security engineer"
Solution: Hire security engineers.

"In my opinion we are not at the stage in industry where we can 
consider/expect any developer to think through each implication of 
each feature they implement"
Solution: Hire security engineers to think through each implication.

Why are we disagreeing?

On Sun, Apr 21, 2013 at 12:11:51AM +0100, Benji wrote:
>    Your proposition was that developers will always make mistakes and
>    introduce stupid problems, so a QA team/process is necessary. While I
>    agree that there should be a QA/'audit' at some point, it shouldnt be the
>    stage that is relied on. Applications that are flawed from the design
>    stage onwards will become expenditure blackholes, especially after going
>    through any QA process which should highlight these.
>    Potentially yes, but most of the larger companies appear to already do
>    this. A quick search through google shows that Oracle atleast already
>    have, and/or are actively hiring security engineers involved with Java
>    (for example).
>    Flaws will always pop up and I think we may now be bordering on discussing
>    what counts as negligence in some cases. Your 5-chained-0day-to-code-exec,
>    in my opinion, does not count as negligence and comes from the developer
>    effectively not being a security engineer, but doing the job of a
>    developer. In my opinion we are not at the stage in industry where we can
>    consider/expect any developer to think through each implication of each
>    feature they implement, without a strong security background as much as we
>    may appreciate it. Negligence in my opinion of security vulnerabilities is
>    having obvious format string bugs/buffer overflows when handling user
>    input for example, or incorrect permissions, or just a lack of
>    consideration to obvious problems. Developer training should pick up on
>    the obvious bugs, or atleast give developers an understanding of how to
>    handle users/user input in a safe manner, and know the implications of not
>    doing so. 
> 
>    On Sat, Apr 20, 2013 at 11:58 PM, Bryan <bryan@...wildhats.com> wrote:
> 
>      I think the definition of 'needless staff' highly depends on whether you
>      want 'vulnerable software'.
> 
>      Educating current developers is absolutely a good idea, but still not
>      foolproof. The bottom line is that if you want safe software, you need
>      to invest in proper development. As far as I am concerned, for large
>      companies like Adobe and Oracle, where software bugs in your product
>      have a direct impact on the safety of your customers, that involves
>      hiring specialized staff.

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