Message-ID: <004801ce7428$c92063a0$9b7a6fd5@pc>
Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2013 20:55:57 +0300
From: "MustLive" <mustlive@...security.com.ua>
To: "Julius Kivim?ki" <julius.kivimaki@...il.com>
Cc: full-disclosure <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Denial of Service in WordPress

Hi Julius!

Why do you think it will be very slowly? For last 5.5 years you the first said me concerning Looped DoS that requests will be sending very slowly. So think about it. Because all those web sites owners and all those web developers, in which web applications I've found Looped DoS vulnerabilities, after my informing fixed the holes or said that they will take it into account, but never used such argument.

The requests speed will be the next (tested on http://tinyurl.com/loopeddos1):

- In average 5.83 - 7 requests/s for looped redirect with 301/302 responses. I.e. it takes 3-3.6 seconds for Firefox to make 21 request before blocking redirect loop (and showing error message). Situation is similar in other browsers, which support blocking. Didn't examine old IE, which doesn't block infinite loops, but the speed must be the same.

- The faster will be working target web sites, the faster will be request rate.

- It's for browsers, but there are also other clients. Especially such as bots with no redirection limits. Which can work even faster.

- If the looped requests will be going inside one domain, then the speed will be faster (and it'll useful for attacking not only WordPress < 2.3, but also WP 2.3 - 3.5.2). And overload will not be splitting between two domains (like it's showing in my two examples with tinyurl.com).

- Open two or more iframes with looped redirect to the same site, to multiply the speed of attack.

- Make sufficient amount of clients (people or bots) to unknowingly participate in the attack, such as 1000 and more clients and it'll be sufficient to DoS the site on slow server.

Note that every attack is going infinitely (at using appropriate clients or at using JS or meta-refresh to prevent normal browsers from stopping endless loop), not just single request from every client. No need to think that in 2013 every web site owner has resources like Google has. There are a lot of sites on slow servers and there are a lot of sites with redirectors (and even real Looped DoS holes are rare, but with using of redirectors it's possible to create such one at any web site with redirector).

Best wishes & regards,
MustLive
Administrator of Websecurity web site
http://websecurity.com.ua
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Julius Kivimдki 
  To: MustLive 
  Cc: Ryan Dewhurst ; full-disclosure 
  Sent: Friday, June 28, 2013 12:59 AM
  Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Denial of Service in WordPress


  So basically this results in client sending HTTP GET requests very slowly. How will that lead to DoS? (We aren't in 1980 anymore)



  2013/6/27 MustLive <mustlive@...security.com.ua>

    Hello Ryan!

    Attack exactly overload web sites presented in endless loop of redirects. As I showed in all cases of Looped DoS vulnerabilities in web sites and web applications, which I wrote about during 2008 (when I created this type of attacks) - 2013.

    Particularly concerning web applications, before WordPress, I wrote about Looped DoS in Power Phlogger (2009), OpenX/Openads (2009), MODx (2012). If you don't understand this type of attack, you should asked in previous years. Since it's ~5,5 years old attack, since I created in beginning of 2008. And I consider it as a thing which people should be aware about (like about XSS and CSRF). So I recommend you to read my 2008's articles on this topic.

    First I've described Looped DoS in November 2008 in my Classification of DoS vulnerabilities in web applications (http://websecurity.com.ua/2663/) and then in more details in article Looped DoS (http://websecurity.com.ua/2698/). In standard case Looped DoS happens when web applications is redirecting on itself (endless redirect). Browsers vendors long time ago became fighting with such state - like Mozilla in earlier versions of their Mozilla browser added "Redirect Loop Error" warning (the same function later received Firefox). But not Internet Explorer. In beginning of 2008 I was not using Opera (so can't say in which version they added this protection) and there was no Chrome, and among my browsers only Mozilla and Firefox had such protection, but IE was affected. And exactly IE was the most popular browser that time, so such attack would be working in most clients.

    Besides, as I always noted in my articles, that there can be such clients, like spiders and other bots (with no limits on redirects), which can overload looped site (sites) by going such link. Anyway with time there was appeared more browsers with "Redirect Loop Error", so later I created two methods of bypassing "redirect limit" in browsers and described them in February 2009 in my article Hellfire for redirectors. About them I've mentioned in my last advisory. The first one is presented in looped redirector (http://tinyurl.com/hellfire-url), which I made for that article and the second method - it's using JS (both redirects or one redirect on JS and one via 301/302), because browsers only blocks endless redirects which use only server headers. With using this methods of creating "Redirector hell" the attack will work in all browsers.

    If standard case Looped DoS (redirecting on itself) is rare, then there are large number of redirectors out there. Which can be used also for DoS attacks. So I used them and created attack described in articles Redirectors' hell (http://websecurity.com.ua/2670/) and Hellfire for redirectors (http://websecurity.com.ua/2854/). Never translated these articles to English. This attacks (between two redirector services and between web site and redirector service) allow to create Looped DoS from a redirector at any site, just needed one redirector to have predictable address, like in case of TinyURL's custom alias feature. After that in 2009 in my articles "Redirectors: the phantom menace" (http://websecurity.com.ua/3495/) and "Attacks via closed redirectors" (http://websecurity.com.ua/3531/) I wrote about all possible attacks via open and closed redirectors, including Looped DoS. So all who want could be familiar with this attack.

    > This just affects the client though right? 

    This DoS only going on client side unlike other types of DoS (see my classification), but issue of web application is in allowing Looped DoS state. You see error message very quickly because you are leaving in 2013 (where already many browsers protect against simple form of Looped DoS) and using secure browser - use a browser without this protection (like IE) and have fun.

    > From my understanding you'd have to get the user to click on the tinyurl

    How the attack must go to benefit the attacker. One way is to give people (with vulnerable browsers) to click the link and see endless loop - it'll not give enough overload on target server, since people will quickly close the browser's tab/window. Another one is to give that link to crazy bots (like from search engines), who has no limits on redirects - it'll endlessly connect to target site/sites and overload them. Even better way is to put iframe which leads to such redirector at some sites (the more the better) - it can be ad network with such "fun banner" or hacked web sites with added iframe or via persistent XSS hole. While people will be at such sites the browser in background will be infinitely sending requests to target site/sites (in case of WP redirectors it will be two sites for the first attack with using of tinyurl.com and one site in case of the second attack, which works in all WordPress, including WP 3.5.2). The more time people spend on particular page with injected iframe with endless redirect and the more people are visiting such sites, the more effect will be. No need to ask people to "participate in DoS attack", their browser will be automatically "participating" via Looped DoS attack (just by entering in any way this endless loop).

    Best wishes & regards,
    MustLive
    Administrator of Websecurity web site
    http://websecurity.com.ua
      ----- Original Message ----- 
      From: Ryan Dewhurst 
      To: MustLive 
      Cc: submissions@...ketstormsecurity.org ; full-disclosure ; 1337 Exploit DataBase 
      Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2013 8:34 PM
      Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Denial of Service in WordPress


      This just affects the client though right? So doesn't DoS a WordPress blog, just presents an error message to the user if they click on a crafted link. How could this be used in the real world to cause any risk? 


      From my understanding you'd have to get the user to click on the tinyurl, which would then show them a browser redirect error? If this is the case, how does this benefit an attacker?



      On Thu, Jun 27, 2013 at 7:28 PM, MustLive <mustlive@...security.com.ua> wrote:

        Hello list!

        These are Denial of Service vulnerabilities WordPress. Which I've disclosed two days ago (http://websecurity.com.ua/6600/).

        About XSS vulnerabilities in WordPress, which exist in two redirectors, I wrote last year (http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Mar/343). About Redirector vulnerabilities in these WP scripts I wrote already in 2007 (and made patches for them). The developers fixed redirectors in WP 2.3, so Redirector and XSS attacks are possible only in previous versions.

        As I've recently checked, this functionality can be used for conducting DoS attacks. I.e. to make Looped DoS vulnerabilities from two redirectors (according to Classification of DoS vulnerabilities in web applications (http://websecurity.com.ua/2663/)), by combining web site on WordPress with redirecting service or other site. This attack is similar to looping two redirectors, described in my articles Redirectors' hell and Hellfire for redirectors. The interesting, that looped redirector (http://tinyurl.com/hellfire-url), which I've made at 5th of February 2009 for my article Hellfire for redirectors, is still working.

        -------------------------
        Affected products:
        -------------------------

        Vulnerable are all versions of WordPress: for easy attack - WP 2.2.3 and previous versions, for harder attack - WP 3.5.2 and previous versions. The second variant of attack requires Redirector or XSS vulnerability at the same domain, as web site on WP.

        ----------
        Details:
        ----------

        Denial of Service (WASC-10):

        It's needed to create Custom alias at tinyurl.com or other redirector service, which will be leading to wp-login.php or wp-pass.php with setting alias for redirection.

        http://site/wp-login.php?action=logout&redirect_to=http://tinyurl.com/loopeddos1

        http://site/wp-pass.php?_wp_http_referer=http://tinyurl.com/loopeddos2

        Here are examples of these vulnerabilities:

        http://tinyurl.com/loopeddos1

        http://tinyurl.com/loopeddos2

        This attack will work for WordPress < 2.3. At that Mozilla, Firefox, Chrome and Opera will stop endless redirect after series of requests, unlike IE.

        To make this attack work in all versions of the engine, including WordPress 3.5.2, it's needed that redirector was on the same domain, as web site on WP. For this it can be used any vulnerability, e.g. reflected XSS or persistent XSS (at the same domain), for including a script for redirecting to one of these redirectors:

        WordPress_Looped_DoS.html

        <script>document.location="http://site/wp-login.php?action=logout&redirect_to=http://site/WordPress_Looped_DoS.html"</script>

        WordPress_Looped_DoS-2.html

        <script>document.location="http://site/wp-pass.php"</script>

        This attack will work as in WordPress 3.5.2 and previous versions, as it isn't stopping by the browsers (endless redirect).

        Best wishes & regards,
        MustLive
        Administrator of Websecurity web site
        http://websecurity.com.ua
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