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Message-ID: <6629.1372871409@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Date: Wed, 03 Jul 2013 13:10:09 -0400
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@...edu
To: Michael T <mt2410689@...il.com>
Cc: "full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: tor vulnerabilities?
On Wed, 03 Jul 2013 10:54:09 -0500, Michael T said:
> What about keysigning among tor operators? I trust top_op1, and he trusts
> top_op2, 3, and 4, so I can trust them as well.
Chunk it through - if you make keysigning mandatory, you're probably going
to see a drop from the current 4,000 or so relays down to maybe 500 or so.
At which point it becomes *easier* for a group to subvert enough servers
to deanonymize people.
And how do you get a new Tor relay set up if a key signing is mandatory?
There's also a more subtle problem. A PGP-style web-of-trust doesn't say
anything about whether you should actually trust the *content* of signed data
as far as content goes, only that it's from the signature it claims to be. So
if you sign my Tor key, what are you *actually* attesting to? Only the fact
that I run a Tor relay or three. You aren't actually saying anything about
whether or not I'm part of the cabal trying to take over Tor.
So unless signing a key includes an attestation/verification that the key
you're signing isn't for a server that's part of the cabal (and how would
you verify that before you sign?), the key signing doesn't actually add any
real security.
Content of type "application/pgp-signature" skipped
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