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Message-ID: <CA+1kKf6wbz1_BqtR3mdUM52otoWD_Gmo0hSfZsbn+-jy5ru5Dw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jul 2013 22:16:29 +0100
From: some one <s3cret.squirell@...il.com>
To: Gregory Boddin <gregory@...hine.net>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Abusing Windows 7 Recovery Process

On Jul 10, 2013 1:51 PM, "Gregory Boddin" <gregory@...hine.net> wrote:
>
> It won't.
>
> The whole point is to have full local access to hard-drives (from a
locked workstation for eg), to modify/read things in it.
>
> The loaded environment IS a live environment. I would say: almost a copy
of the install CD loaded from the hard-drive.
>
> What you can do is : take the SAM, modify somewhere else (not a windows
expert tough), re-inject and gain local access. (which is kind of useless
since local data are already available once the recovery is booted, unless
there's software you would like to run in that workstation once the
password is reset).

Hmm, not sure about this...

Haven't tried but lets say we can copy the SAM off the box somehow,
recovery console is running as system which can read the SAM and
>
> On 9 July 2013 20:39, some one <s3cret.squirell@...il.com> wrote:
>>
>> My initial thoughts after adding the user and rebooting was that it was
only valid in the recovery console session or something as once i rebooted
it was gone...
>>
>> Tried it again today in a different place and same deal. Reboot no new
user...
>>
>> Anyone have this working after reboot?
>>
>> Once you've inserted your payload with admin-or-better rights, it can be
>> anything from a rootkit that GP can't touch to a patched GP subsys that
>> doesn't apply AD policies. This isn't really a caveat.
>>
>>
>> On 2013-07-08 12:39:18 (+0200), Fabien DUCHENE wrote:
>> > There may be an Active Directory domain policy which only allows a
>> > configured set of groups/users to be admin of your workstation.
>> > Keep in mind domain policies are applied at startup and periodically.
>>
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>
>

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