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Message-ID: <20140220212541.GA3199@pisco.westfalen.local>
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 22:25:41 +0100
From: Moritz Muehlenhoff <jmm@...ian.org>
To: debian-security-announce@...ts.debian.org
Subject: [SECURITY] [DSA 2865-1] postgresql-9.1 security
	update

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- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
Debian Security Advisory DSA-2865-1                   security@...ian.org
http://www.debian.org/security/                        Moritz Muehlenhoff
February 20, 2014                      http://www.debian.org/security/faq
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------

Package        : postgresql-9.1
Vulnerability  : several
CVE ID         : CVE-2014-0060 CVE-2014-0061 CVE-2014-0062 CVE-2014-0063 
                 CVE-2014-0064 CVE-2014-0065 CVE-2014-0066 CVE-2014-0067

Various vulnerabilities were discovered in PostgreSQL:

 * Shore up GRANT ... WITH ADMIN OPTION restrictions (Noah Misch)

   Granting a role without ADMIN OPTION is supposed to prevent the grantee
   from adding or removing members from the granted role, but this
   restriction was easily bypassed by doing SET ROLE first. The security
   impact is mostly that a role member can revoke the access of others,
   contrary to the wishes of his grantor. Unapproved role member additions
   are a lesser concern, since an uncooperative role member could provide
   most of his rights to others anyway by creating views or SECURITY
   DEFINER functions. (CVE-2014-0060)

 * Prevent privilege escalation via manual calls to PL validator functions
   (Andres Freund)

   The primary role of PL validator functions is to be called implicitly
   during CREATE FUNCTION, but they are also normal SQL functions that a
   user can call explicitly. Calling a validator on a function actually
   written in some other language was not checked for and could be
   exploited for privilege-escalation purposes. The fix involves adding a
   call to a privilege-checking function in each validator function.
   Non-core procedural languages will also need to make this change to
   their own validator functions, if any. (CVE-2014-0061)

 * Avoid multiple name lookups during table and index DDL (Robert Haas,
   Andres Freund)

   If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
   activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
   than other parts. At least in the case of CREATE INDEX, this can be used
   to cause the permissions checks to be performed against a different
   table than the index creation, allowing for a privilege escalation
   attack. (CVE-2014-0062)

 * Prevent buffer overrun with long datetime strings (Noah Misch)

   The MAXDATELEN constant was too small for the longest possible value of
   type interval, allowing a buffer overrun in interval_out(). Although the
   datetime input functions were more careful about avoiding buffer
   overrun, the limit was short enough to cause them to reject some valid
   inputs, such as input containing a very long timezone name. The ecpg
   library contained these vulnerabilities along with some of its own.
   (CVE-2014-0063)

 * Prevent buffer overrun due to integer overflow in size calculations
   (Noah Misch, Heikki Linnakangas)

   Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
   size without checking for overflow. If overflow did occur, a too-small
   buffer would be allocated and then written past. (CVE-2014-0064)

 * Prevent overruns of fixed-size buffers (Peter Eisentraut, Jozef Mlich)

   Use strlcpy() and related functions to provide a clear guarantee that
   fixed-size buffers are not overrun. Unlike the preceding items, it is
   unclear whether these cases really represent live issues, since in most
   cases there appear to be previous constraints on the size of the input
   string. Nonetheless it seems prudent to silence all Coverity warnings of
   this type. (CVE-2014-0065)

 * Avoid crashing if crypt() returns NULL (Honza Horak, Bruce Momjian)

   There are relatively few scenarios in which crypt() could return NULL,
   but contrib/chkpass would crash if it did. One practical case in which
   this could be an issue is if libc is configured to refuse to execute
   unapproved hashing algorithms (e.g., "FIPS mode"). (CVE-2014-0066)

 * Document risks of make check in the regression testing instructions
   (Noah Misch, Tom Lane)

   Since the temporary server started by make check uses "trust"
   authentication, another user on the same machine could connect to it as
   database superuser, and then potentially exploit the privileges of the
   operating-system user who started the tests. A future release will
   probably incorporate changes in the testing procedure to prevent this
   risk, but some public discussion is needed first. So for the moment,
   just warn people against using make check when there are untrusted users
   on the same machine. (CVE-2014-0067)

For the stable distribution (wheezy), these problems have been fixed in
version 9.1_9.1.12-0wheezy1.

For the unstable distribution (sid), these problems have been fixed in
version 9.3.3-1 of the postgresql-9.3 package.

We recommend that you upgrade your postgresql-9.1 packages.

Further information about Debian Security Advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system and frequently asked questions can be
found at: http://www.debian.org/security/

Mailing list: debian-security-announce@...ts.debian.org
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