full-disclosure - Re: Google vulnerabilities with PoC

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Message-ID: <CAPMrQTTOU3+DtwgRpE-yDLhwD0X7ikEr=dFZJOYnUneKFEhZ1w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 21:02:46 +0200
From: Julius Kivimäki <julius.kivimaki@...il.com>
To: "Nicholas Lemonias." <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
Cc: "full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Google vulnerabilities with PoC

I don't see what OSI model has to do with anything here. Why is arbitrary
file upload to youtube CDN any worse than to google drive CDN? And how will
your "self-executing encrypted virus like Cryptolocker" end up getting
executed anyways? And cryptolocker was definitely not "self-executing", but
spread via email attachments (excluding the boring USB spread
functionality).

What you have here is not a vulnerability, just give up. And stop trying to
get "journalists" like Eduard Kovacs to spread your BS.

2014-03-13 19:10 GMT+02:00 Nicholas Lemonias. <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>:

> Hello Julius,
>
> I appreciate your interest to learn more. OWASP is quite credible, and has
> gained some international recognition. It is a benchmark for many vendors.
> I suggest you to read on OSI/7-Layer Model. A website may disallow uploads
> of certain file types for security reasons, and let's assume at the
> application layer. If we manage to get past the security controls, that
> means  we can write unrestrictedly any type of file to the remote network.
> That also means that we get past their firewall, since the communication is
> through HTTP (port 80). CDN nodes are deployed to multiple colocation
> (thousands of nodes and thousands of servers across the world). The files
> (let's say a self-executing encrypted virus like Cryptolocker? ) are cached
> deeply in the network across thousands of servers.
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 5:07 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Hello Julius,
>>
>> I appreciate your interest to learn more. OWASP is quite credible, and
>> has gained some international recognition. It is a benchmark for many
>> vendors. I suggest you to read on OSI/7-Layer Model. A website may disallow
>> uploads of certain file types for security reasons, and let's assume at the
>> application layer. If we manage to get past the security controls, that
>> means  we can write unrestrictedly any type of file to the remote network.
>> That also means that we get past their firewall, since the communication is
>> through HTTP (port 80). CDN nodes are deployed to multiple colocation
>> (thousands of nodes and thousands of servers across the world). The files
>> are cached deep in the network structures to thousands of servers.
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 4:20 PM, Julius Kivimäki <
>> julius.kivimaki@...il.com> wrote:
>>
>>> OWASP is recognized worldwide, so is CEH and a bunch of other morons.
>>> That doesn't mean their publications are worth anything. Now tell me, why
>>> would arbitrary file upload on a CDN lead to code execution (Besides for
>>> HTML, which you have been unable to confirm)?
>>>
>>>
>>> 2014-03-13 18:16 GMT+02:00 Nicholas Lemonias. <
>>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>:
>>>
>>> *You are wrong about accessing the files. What has not been confirmed is
>>>> remote code execution. We are working on it.*
>>>> *And please, OWASP is recognised worldwide... *
>>>>
>>>> *Files can be accessed through Google Take out with a little bit of
>>>> skills.*
>>>>
>>>> *https://www.google.com/settings/takeout
>>>> <https://www.google.com/settings/takeout> *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 4:09 PM, Julius Kivimäki <
>>>> julius.kivimaki@...il.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Did you even read that article? (Not that OWASP has any sort of
>>>>> credibility anyways). From what I saw in your previous post you are both
>>>>> unable to execute the files or even access them and thus unable to
>>>>> manipulate the content-type the files are returned with, therefore there is
>>>>> no vulnerability (According to the article you linked.).
>>>>>
>>>>> BTW, you should look for more cool vulnerabilities in amazons EC2, I'm
>>>>> sure you will find some "Unrestricted File Upload" holes.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 2014-03-13 16:18 GMT+02:00 Nicholas Lemonias. <
>>>>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>:
>>>>>
>>>>> Here is your answer.
>>>>>> https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted_File_Upload
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 1:39 PM, Julius Kivimäki <
>>>>>> julius.kivimaki@...il.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When did the ability to upload files of arbitrary types become a
>>>>>>> security issue? If the file doesn't get executed, it's really not a
>>>>>>> problem. (Besides from potentially breaking site layout standpoint.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2014-03-13 12:43 GMT+02:00 Nicholas Lemonias. <
>>>>>>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Google vulnerabilities uncovered...
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> http://news.softpedia.com/news/Expert-Finds-File-Upload-Vulnerability-in-YouTube-Google-Denies-It-s-a-Security-Issue-431489.shtml
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>>>>>>>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>>>>>>>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>

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