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Message-ID: <CA+CewVC9LYNi-93n6uTknu0qqPB5TMM3LsrQi-bvAuz5Fj1D2A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2014 19:48:27 +0000
From: "Nicholas Lemonias." <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
To: Julius Kivimäki <julius.kivimaki@...il.com>,
full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
Julius Kivimaki, your disbelief in OWASP, CEH, Journalists and anything you
may, or may not be qualified to question amazes. But everyone's opinion is
of course respected.
I normally don't provide security lessons via e-mail and full-disclosure,
however you seem not to understand the security report fully and some core
principles. If you can't see what information security best practises, the
OSI/network model and self-automata propagation has anything to do with
arbitrary write permissions to a remote network leveraging from the
application layer, then me and you have nothing to talk about.
As for the exploitability of this vulnerability, you will never know until
you try. And we have tried it , and seem to know better.
I suggest you read the report again.
Thank you.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Nicholas Lemonias. <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
Date: Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 7:47 PM
Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC
To: Julius Kivimäki <julius.kivimaki@...il.com>
Julius Kivimaki, your disbelief in OWASP, CEH, Journalists and anything you
may, or may not be qualified to question amazes. But everyone's opinion is
of course respected.
I normally don't provide security lessons via e-mail and full-disclosure,
however you seem not to understand the security report fully and some core
principles. If you can't see what information security best practises, the
OSI/network model and self-automata propagation has anything to do with
arbitrary write permissions to a remote network leveraging from the
application layer, then me and you have nothing to talk about.
As for the exploitability of this vulnerability, you will never know until
you try. And we have tried it , and seem to know better.
I suggest you read the report again.
Thank you.
On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 7:02 PM, Julius Kivimäki
<julius.kivimaki@...il.com>wrote:
> I don't see what OSI model has to do with anything here. Why is arbitrary
> file upload to youtube CDN any worse than to google drive CDN? And how will
> your "self-executing encrypted virus like Cryptolocker" end up getting
> executed anyways? And cryptolocker was definitely not "self-executing", but
> spread via email attachments (excluding the boring USB spread
> functionality).
>
> What you have here is not a vulnerability, just give up. And stop trying
> to get "journalists" like Eduard Kovacs to spread your BS.
>
> 2014-03-13 19:10 GMT+02:00 Nicholas Lemonias. <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
> :
>
> Hello Julius,
>>
>> I appreciate your interest to learn more. OWASP is quite credible, and
>> has gained some international recognition. It is a benchmark for many
>> vendors. I suggest you to read on OSI/7-Layer Model. A website may disallow
>> uploads of certain file types for security reasons, and let's assume at the
>> application layer. If we manage to get past the security controls, that
>> means we can write unrestrictedly any type of file to the remote network.
>> That also means that we get past their firewall, since the communication is
>> through HTTP (port 80). CDN nodes are deployed to multiple colocation
>> (thousands of nodes and thousands of servers across the world). The files
>> (let's say a self-executing encrypted virus like Cryptolocker? ) are cached
>> deeply in the network across thousands of servers.
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 5:07 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Hello Julius,
>>>
>>> I appreciate your interest to learn more. OWASP is quite credible, and
>>> has gained some international recognition. It is a benchmark for many
>>> vendors. I suggest you to read on OSI/7-Layer Model. A website may disallow
>>> uploads of certain file types for security reasons, and let's assume at the
>>> application layer. If we manage to get past the security controls, that
>>> means we can write unrestrictedly any type of file to the remote network.
>>> That also means that we get past their firewall, since the communication is
>>> through HTTP (port 80). CDN nodes are deployed to multiple colocation
>>> (thousands of nodes and thousands of servers across the world). The files
>>> are cached deep in the network structures to thousands of servers.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 4:20 PM, Julius Kivimäki <
>>> julius.kivimaki@...il.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> OWASP is recognized worldwide, so is CEH and a bunch of other morons.
>>>> That doesn't mean their publications are worth anything. Now tell me, why
>>>> would arbitrary file upload on a CDN lead to code execution (Besides for
>>>> HTML, which you have been unable to confirm)?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 2014-03-13 18:16 GMT+02:00 Nicholas Lemonias. <
>>>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>:
>>>>
>>>> *You are wrong about accessing the files. What has not been confirmed
>>>>> is remote code execution. We are working on it.*
>>>>> *And please, OWASP is recognised worldwide... *
>>>>>
>>>>> *Files can be accessed through Google Take out with a little bit of
>>>>> skills.*
>>>>>
>>>>> *https://www.google.com/settings/takeout
>>>>> <https://www.google.com/settings/takeout> *
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 4:09 PM, Julius Kivimäki <
>>>>> julius.kivimaki@...il.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Did you even read that article? (Not that OWASP has any sort of
>>>>>> credibility anyways). From what I saw in your previous post you are both
>>>>>> unable to execute the files or even access them and thus unable to
>>>>>> manipulate the content-type the files are returned with, therefore there is
>>>>>> no vulnerability (According to the article you linked.).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> BTW, you should look for more cool vulnerabilities in amazons EC2,
>>>>>> I'm sure you will find some "Unrestricted File Upload" holes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2014-03-13 16:18 GMT+02:00 Nicholas Lemonias. <
>>>>>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Here is your answer.
>>>>>>> https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Unrestricted_File_Upload
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 1:39 PM, Julius Kivimäki <
>>>>>>> julius.kivimaki@...il.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When did the ability to upload files of arbitrary types become a
>>>>>>>> security issue? If the file doesn't get executed, it's really not a
>>>>>>>> problem. (Besides from potentially breaking site layout standpoint.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 2014-03-13 12:43 GMT+02:00 Nicholas Lemonias. <
>>>>>>>> lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Google vulnerabilities uncovered...
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> http://news.softpedia.com/news/Expert-Finds-File-Upload-Vulnerability-in-YouTube-Google-Denies-It-s-a-Security-Issue-431489.shtml
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>>>>>>>>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>>>>>>>>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
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