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Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2014 18:07:43 +0000
From: antisnatchor <antisnatchor@...il.com>
To: "Nicholas Lemonias." <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC

LOL I don't work for Google and you can easily verify that.

Also, your XSS PoCs suck, they don't even trigger automatically but the
victim needs to
go with the mouse over the element LOL:
http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/125135/Visa-Europe-Cross-Site-Scripting.html

Lame

Nicholas Lemonias. wrote:
> Quite funnily, most erratic comments originate from a @gmail.com
> <http://gmail.com/> host. Does that mean that Google and Co are
> attacking the researcher ?
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:06 PM, Nicholas Lemonias.
> <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>> wrote:
>
>     Quite funnily, most erratic comments originate from a @gmail.com
>     <http://gmail.com> host. Does that mean that Google and Co are
>     attacking the researcher ?
>      
>      
>
>
>     On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 PM, Mike Hale
>     <eyeronic.design@...il.com <mailto:eyeronic.design@...il.com>> wrote:
>
>         No, you're saying something's a vulnerability without showing any
>         indication of how it can be abused.
>
>         On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 11:00 AM, Nicholas Lemonias.
>         <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com
>         <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>> wrote:
>         > The full-disclosure mailing list has really changed. It's
>         full of lamers
>         > nowdays aiming high.
>         >
>         >
>         >
>         >
>         >
>         > On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM, Nicholas Lemonias.
>         > <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com
>         <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>> wrote:
>         >>
>         >> Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My
>         customers are FTSE
>         >> 100.
>         >>
>         >> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>         >> From: Nicholas Lemonias. <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com
>         <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>>
>         >> Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:58 PM
>         >> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Fwd: Google vulnerabilities
>         with PoC
>         >> To: antisnatchor <antisnatchor@...il.com
>         <mailto:antisnatchor@...il.com>>
>         >>
>         >>
>         >> Says the script kiddie... Beg for some publicity. My
>         customers are FTSE
>         >> 100.
>         >>
>         >>
>         >>
>         >>
>         >> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:55 PM, antisnatchor
>         <antisnatchor@...il.com <mailto:antisnatchor@...il.com>>
>         >> wrote:
>         >>>
>         >>> LOL you're hopeless.
>         >>> Good luck with your business. Brave customers!
>         >>>
>         >>> Cheers
>         >>> antisnatchor
>         >>>
>         >>> Nicholas Lemonias. wrote:
>         >>>
>         >>>
>         >>> People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do
>         basic things
>         >>> like reading a vulnerability report?
>         >>>
>         >>> Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary
>         files. If I
>         >>> was your boss I would fire you.
>         >>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>         >>> From: Nicholas Lemonias. <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com
>         <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>>
>         >>> Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 5:43 PM
>         >>> Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Google vulnerabilities with PoC
>         >>> To: Mario Vilas <mvilas@...il.com <mailto:mvilas@...il.com>>
>         >>>
>         >>>
>         >>> People can read the report if they like. Can't you even do
>         basic things
>         >>> like reading a vulnerability report?
>         >>>
>         >>> Can't you see that the advisory is about writing arbitrary
>         files. If I
>         >>> was your boss I would fire you, with a good kick outta the
>         door.
>         >>>
>         >>>
>         >>>
>         >>>
>         >>>
>         >>>
>         >>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Mario Vilas
>         <mvilas@...il.com <mailto:mvilas@...il.com>> wrote:
>         >>>>
>         >>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias.
>         >>>> <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com
>         <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>> wrote:
>         >>>>>
>         >>>>> Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on
>         revisiting  separation
>         >>>>> of duties in this security instance.
>         >>>>>
>         >>>>> Happy to see more professionals with some skills.  Some
>         others have
>         >>>>> also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service
>         attacks. Remote code
>         >>>>> execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent
>         scenario.
>         >>>>
>         >>>>
>         >>>> Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the
>         opposite. But if you
>         >>>> insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading
>         files, good luck to you
>         >>>> then...
>         >>>>
>         >>>>>
>         >>>>>
>         >>>>> If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably
>         coming from a
>         >>>>> bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants.
>         >>>>
>         >>>>
>         >>>> You're the only one throwing around certifications here.
>         I can no longer
>         >>>> tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank.
>         >>>>
>         >>>>>
>         >>>>>
>         >>>>> Nicholas.
>         >>>>>
>         >>>>>
>         >>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias.
>         >>>>> <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com
>         <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>> wrote:
>         >>>>>>
>         >>>>>> We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly
>         disagree on those
>         >>>>>> points.
>         >>>>>> I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell
>         if that is a
>         >>>>>> valid vulnerability..
>         >>>>>>
>         >>>>>>
>         >>>>>> Best Regards,
>         >>>>>> Nicholas Lemonias.
>         >>>>>>
>         >>>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas
>         <mvilas@...il.com <mailto:mvilas@...il.com>>
>         >>>>>> wrote:
>         >>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>> But do you have all the required EH certifications?
>         Try this one from
>         >>>>>>> the Institute for
>         >>>>>>> Certified Application Security Specialists:
>         http://www.asscert.com/
>         >>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias.
>         >>>>>>> <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com
>         <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>> wrote:
>         >>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>> Thanks Michal,
>         >>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>> We are just trying to improve Google's security and
>         contribute to
>         >>>>>>>> the research community after all. If you are still on
>         EFNet give me a shout
>         >>>>>>>> some time.
>         >>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>  We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients
>         including
>         >>>>>>>> Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the world's
>         biggest corporations. We are
>         >>>>>>>> also strict supporters of the ACM code of conduct.
>         >>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>> Regards,
>         >>>>>>>> Nicholas Lemonias.
>         >>>>>>>> AISec
>         >>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias.
>         >>>>>>>> <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com
>         <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>> wrote:
>         >>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>> Hi Jerome,
>         >>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>> Thank you for agreeing on access control, and
>         separation of duties.
>         >>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>> However successful exploitation permits arbitrary
>         write() of any
>         >>>>>>>>> file of choice.
>         >>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>> I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or Python
>         that permits
>         >>>>>>>>> multiple file uploads of any file/types, if the
>         Google security team feels
>         >>>>>>>>> that this would be necessary. This is unpaid work,
>         so we are not so keen on
>         >>>>>>>>> that job.
>         >>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias
>         >>>>>>>>> <athiasjerome@...il.com
>         <mailto:athiasjerome@...il.com>> wrote:
>         >>>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>>> Hi
>         >>>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>>> I concur that we are mainly discussing a
>         terminology problem.
>         >>>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>>> In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT, this
>         is a Finding.
>         >>>>>>>>>> Reporting this finding makes sense in this context.
>         >>>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>>> As a professional, you would have to explain if/how
>         this finding
>         >>>>>>>>>> is a
>         >>>>>>>>>> Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations, Compliance,
>         Policies or
>         >>>>>>>>>> Requirements[1])
>         >>>>>>>>>> * I would say Weakness + Exposure = Vulnerability.
>         Vulnerability +
>         >>>>>>>>>> Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability that
>         needs Business
>         >>>>>>>>>> Impact and Risk Analysis
>         >>>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>>> So I would probably have reported this Finding as a
>         Weakness (and
>         >>>>>>>>>> not
>         >>>>>>>>>> Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE),
>         explaining that it is
>         >>>>>>>>>> not
>         >>>>>>>>>> Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat Sheets),
>         and even if
>         >>>>>>>>>> mitigative/compensative security controls (Ref
>         Orange Book),
>         >>>>>>>>>> security
>         >>>>>>>>>> controls like white listing (or at least black
>         listing. see also
>         >>>>>>>>>> ESAPI) should be 1) part of the [1]security
>         requirements of a
>         >>>>>>>>>> proper
>         >>>>>>>>>> SDLC (Build security in) as per Defense-in-Depth
>         security
>         >>>>>>>>>> principles
>         >>>>>>>>>> and 2) used and implemented correctly.
>         >>>>>>>>>> NB: A simple Threat Model (i.e. list of CAPEC)
>         would be a solid
>         >>>>>>>>>> support to your report
>         >>>>>>>>>> This would help to evaluate/measure the risk (e.g.
>         CVSS).
>         >>>>>>>>>> Helping the decision/actions around this risk
>         >>>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>>> PS: interestingly, in this case, I'm not sure that
>         the Separation
>         >>>>>>>>>> of
>         >>>>>>>>>> Duties security principle was applied correctly by
>         Google in term
>         >>>>>>>>>> of
>         >>>>>>>>>> Risk Acceptance (which could be another Finding)
>         >>>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>>> So in few words, be careful with the terminology.
>         (don't always
>         >>>>>>>>>> say
>         >>>>>>>>>> vulnerability like the media say hacker, see
>         RFC1392) Use a CWE ID
>         >>>>>>>>>> (e.g. CWE-434, CWE-183, CWE-184 vs. CWE-616)
>         >>>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>>> My 2 bitcents
>         >>>>>>>>>> Sorry if it is not edible :)
>         >>>>>>>>>> Happy Hacking!
>         >>>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>>> /JA
>         >>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/athiasjerome/XORCISM
>         >>>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>>> 2014-03-14 7:19 GMT+03:00 Michal Zalewski
>         <lcamtuf@...edump.cx <mailto:lcamtuf@...edump.cx>>:
>         >>>>>>>>>> > Nicholas,
>         >>>>>>>>>> >
>         >>>>>>>>>> > I remember my early years in the infosec
>         community - and sadly,
>         >>>>>>>>>> > so do
>         >>>>>>>>>> > some of the more seasoned readers of this list
>         :-) Back then, I
>         >>>>>>>>>> > thought that the only thing that mattered is the
>         ability to find
>         >>>>>>>>>> > bugs.
>         >>>>>>>>>> > But after some 18 years in the industry, I now
>         know that there's
>         >>>>>>>>>> > an
>         >>>>>>>>>> > even more important and elusive skill.
>         >>>>>>>>>> >
>         >>>>>>>>>> > That skill boils down to having a robust mental
>         model of what
>         >>>>>>>>>> > constitutes a security flaw - and being able to
>         explain your
>         >>>>>>>>>> > thinking
>         >>>>>>>>>> > to others in a precise and internally consistent
>         manner that
>         >>>>>>>>>> > convinces
>         >>>>>>>>>> > others to act. We need this because the security
>         of a system
>         >>>>>>>>>> > can't be
>         >>>>>>>>>> > usefully described using abstract terms: even the
>         academic
>         >>>>>>>>>> > definitions
>         >>>>>>>>>> > ultimately boil down to saying "the system is
>         secure if it
>         >>>>>>>>>> > doesn't do
>         >>>>>>>>>> > the things we *really* don't want it to do".
>         >>>>>>>>>> >
>         >>>>>>>>>> > In this spirit, the term "vulnerability" is
>         generally reserved
>         >>>>>>>>>> > for
>         >>>>>>>>>> > behaviors that meet all of the following criteria:
>         >>>>>>>>>> >
>         >>>>>>>>>> > 1) The behavior must have negative consequences
>         for at least one
>         >>>>>>>>>> > of
>         >>>>>>>>>> > the legitimate stakeholders (users, service
>         owners, etc),
>         >>>>>>>>>> >
>         >>>>>>>>>> > 2) The consequences must be widely seen as
>         unexpected and
>         >>>>>>>>>> > unacceptable,
>         >>>>>>>>>> >
>         >>>>>>>>>> > 3) There must be a realistic chance of such a
>         negative outcome,
>         >>>>>>>>>> >
>         >>>>>>>>>> > 4) The behavior must introduce substantial new
>         risks that go
>         >>>>>>>>>> > beyond
>         >>>>>>>>>> > the previously accepted trade-offs.
>         >>>>>>>>>> >
>         >>>>>>>>>> > If we don't have that, we usually don't have a
>         case, no matter
>         >>>>>>>>>> > how
>         >>>>>>>>>> > clever the bug is.
>         >>>>>>>>>> >
>         >>>>>>>>>> > Cheers (and happy hunting!),
>         >>>>>>>>>> > /mz
>         >>>>>>>>>> >
>         >>>>>>>>>> > _______________________________________________
>         >>>>>>>>>> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>         >>>>>>>>>> > Charter:
>         http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>         >>>>>>>>>> > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>         >>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>         >>>>>>>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>         >>>>>>>> Charter:
>         http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>         >>>>>>>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>         >>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>> --
>         >>>>>>> "There's a reason we separate military and the police:
>         one fights the
>         >>>>>>> enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the
>         people. When the
>         >>>>>>> military becomes both, then the enemies of the state
>         tend to become the
>         >>>>>>> people."
>         >>>>>>>
>         >>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>         >>>>>>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>         >>>>>>> Charter:
>         http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>         >>>>>>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>         >>>>>>
>         >>>>>>
>         >>>>>
>         >>>>
>         >>>>
>         >>>>
>         >>>> --
>         >>>> "There's a reason we separate military and the police:
>         one fights the
>         >>>> enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the
>         people. When the
>         >>>> military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend
>         to become the
>         >>>> people."
>         >>>
>         >>>
>         >>>
>         >>> _______________________________________________
>         >>> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>         >>> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>         >>> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>         >>>
>         >>>
>         >>> --
>         >>> Cheers
>         >>> Michele
>         >>>
>         >>
>         >>
>         >
>         >
>         > _______________________________________________
>         > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
>         > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
>         > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>
>
>
>         --
>         09 F9 11 02 9D 74 E3 5B D8 41 56 C5 63 56 88 C0
>
>
>

-- 
Cheers
Michele


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