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Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2014 10:37:11 +0100
From: Mario Vilas <mvilas@...il.com>
To: "Nicholas Lemonias." <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
Cc: "full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk" <full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk>
Subject: Re: Google vulnerabilities with PoC

On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 10:30 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
lem.nikolas@...glemail.com> wrote:

> We confirm this to be a valid vulnerability for the following reasons.
>
> The access control subsystem is defeated, resulting to arbitrary write
> access of any file of choice.
>
> 1. You Tube defines which file types are permitted to be uploaded.
>

And...?


>
> 2. Exploitation is achieved by circumvention of web-based security
> controls (namely http forms, which is a weak security measure). However,
> exploitation of the issue results to unrestricted file uploads (any file of
> choice ). Remote code execution may be possible either through social
> engineering , or by stochastically rewriting an existing file-structure in
> the CDN.
>

So in ohter words, you haven't proven it. The upload in itself is not a
vulnerability (and if you understood that it is, please read again that
OWASP document).


>
> 3. This directly impacts the integrity of the service since modification
> of information occurs by circumvention. Renaming the uploaded files can be
> achieved through YouTube's inherent video manager.
>

How does it impact the integrity? Again, unexpected functionality does not
necessarily equal exploitation.


>
> 4. Denial of Service  attacks are feasible since we bypass all security
> restrictions. This directly impacts the availability of the service.
>

Not proven either. At this point I feel you're just making stuff up. All
you did was upload stuff you can't download afterwards.


>
> 5. Malware propagation is possible, if the planted code get's executed
> through social engineering or by re-writing a valid file system structure.
>
>

Again, you need to be able to download the stuff you uploaded, and have it
executed directly. Otherwise you could do the same thing more efficiently
with Google Drive.


>
> 6) All uploaded files can be downloaded through Google Take Out, if past
> the Content ID filtering algorithm (through file header obfuscation and
> encryption).
>

You need to explain how that is an attack vector.


>
>
> Best Regards,
> Nicholas Lemonias
> Advanced Information Security Corp.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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-- 
“There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights the enemy
of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When the military
becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to become the people.”

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