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Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2014 23:58:13 +0100
From: Mario Vilas <>
To: "Nicholas Lemonias." <>
Cc: "" <>
Subject: Re: Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC

So if you can upload a file to Google Drive and trick someone to run it,
you'd call that a vulnerability too?

Hey, I've got another one. I can upload a video on Youtube telling people
to download and install a virus. I'll claim a prize too!

Keep at it man, you're hilarious! xDDD

/me goes grab more popcorn

On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 8:28 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. <> wrote:

> Then that also means that firewalls and IPS systems are worthless. Why
> spend so much time protecting the network layers if a user can send any
> file of choice to a remote network through http...
> As for the uploaded files being persistent, there is evidence of that.
> For instance a remote admin could be tricked to execute some of
> the uploaded files (Social Engineering).
> So our report sent as part of Google's security program, should not be
> treated as a non-security issue.
> Thanks,
> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:23 PM, R D <> wrote:
>> I'm going to try to spell it out clearly.
>> You don't have unrestricted file upload[1]. Keep in mind you're trying to
>> abuse youtube, which is essentially a video file upload service. So the
>> fact that you can upload files is not surprising.
>> Now you're uploading non-video files. Cool. But not earth-shattering.
>> They are not accessible to anyone but you, as far as I can tell, and I
>> don't even think you can access the file contents on the remote server, but
>> please prove me wrong on both points.
>> You are still, as far as I can tell, bound by the per-file and
>> per-account quota on disk occupation, so you don't have a DoS by resource
>> exhaustion.
>> You can't force server-side file path, so you don't have RFI or DoS by
>> messing with the remote file system. You can't execute the files you
>> uploaded, so you don't have arbitrary code execution.
>> But you are right about what your PoC does. You bypassed a security
>> control, you uploaded crap on youtube servers, and by that you exhausted
>> their resources by a fraction of the quota they allow you when signing up.
>> BTW, I don't think they keep invalid video files for an indefinite period
>> of time in a user account, but I might be wrong.
>> The burden of proof is still on your side as to whether or not the bug
>> you found has any impact that was not already accepted by youtube allowing
>> registered users to upload whatever crap they see fit as long as it is
>> video. You failed to provide this proof, and please be sure the audience of
>> fulldisclosure is not "attacking the researcher" but working with you to
>> have a better understanding of the bug you found, even though you kinda
>> acted like a fool in this thread.
>> Please keep on searching and finding vulns, please keep on publishing
>> them, and use this as a learning experience that not all bugs or control
>> bypasses are security vulnerabilities.
>> --Rob'
>> [1] As per OWASP (
>> >There are really two classes of problems here. The first is with the
>> file metadata, like the path and file name. These are generally provided by
>> the transport, such as HTTP multi-part encoding. This data may trick the
>> application into overwriting a critical file or storing the file in a bad
>> location. You must validate the metadata extremely carefully before using
>> it.
>> Your POC doesn't demonstrate that.
>> >The other class of problem is with the file size or content. The range
>> of problems here depends entirely on what the file is used for. See the
>> examples below for some ideas about how files might be misused. To protect
>> against this type of attack, you should analyze everything your application
>> does with files and think carefully about what processing and interpreters
>> are involved.
>> Your POC kinda does that, but you didn't provide proof it's possible to
>> execute what you uploaded, either using social engineering or any other
>> method.
>> Also, please don't say "verified by a couple of recognised experts
>> including OWASP" unless you actually spoke with someone @owasp and she
>> validated your findings.
>> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:40 PM, Nicholas Lemonias. <
>>> wrote:
>>> We have many PoC's including video clips. We may upload for the security
>>> world to see.
>>> However, this is not the way to treat security vulnerabilities.
>>> Attacking the researcher and bringing you friends to do aswell, won't
>>> mitigate the problem.
>>> _______________________________________________
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> _______________________________________________
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> Charter:
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia -

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