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Message-ID: <532349E1.70404@tmacuk.co.uk>
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2014 18:26:41 +0000
From: Thomas MacKenzie <thomas@...cuk.co.uk>
To: "Nicholas Lemonias." <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
Cc: full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk
Subject: Re: Fwd: Google vulnerabilities with PoC
You have a Googlemail account. How do we know you don't work for Google
too...
Inception type stuff going on here.
> Nicholas Lemonias. <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
> 14 March 2014 18:17
> Google is a great service, but according to our proof of concepts
> (images, poc's, codes) presented to Softpedia, and verified
> by a couple of recognised experts including OWASP - that was a serious
> vulnerability.
>
> Now you can say whatever you like, and argue about it. You can argue
> about the impact and whatsoever , but that's not the way to deal with
> security issues.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
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> Nicholas Lemonias. <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
> 14 March 2014 18:16
> Google is a great service, but according to our proof of concepts
> (images, poc's, codes) presented to Softpedia, and verified
> by a couple of recognised experts including OWASP - that was a serious
> vulnerability.
>
> Now you can say whatever you like, and argue about it. You can argue
> about the impact and whatsoever , but that's not the way to deal with
> security issues.
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
> Nicholas Lemonias. <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
> 14 March 2014 18:13
> Security vulnerabilities need to be published and reported. That's the
> spirit.
>
> Attacking the researcher, won't make it go away.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
> Mario Vilas <mailto:mvilas@...il.com>
> 14 March 2014 15:55
> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 12:38 PM, Nicholas Lemonias.
> <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>> wrote:
>
> Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on
> revisiting separation of duties in this security instance.
>
> Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others
> have also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks.
> Remote code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent
> scenario.
>
>
> Actually, people have been pointing out exactly the opposite. But if
> you insist on believing you can DoS an EC2 by uploading files, good
> luck to you then...
>
>
>
> If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming
> from a bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants.
>
>
> You're the only one throwing around certifications here. I can no
> longer tell if you're being serious or this is a massive prank.
>
>
>
> Nicholas.
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Nicholas Lemonias.
> <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>>
> wrote:
>
> We are on a different level perhaps. We do certainly disagree
> on those points.
> I wouldn't hire you as a consultant, if you can't tell if that
> is a valid vulnerability..
>
>
> Best Regards,
> Nicholas Lemonias.
>
> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 10:10 AM, Mario Vilas
> <mvilas@...il.com <mailto:mvilas@...il.com>> wrote:
>
> But do you have all the required EH certifications? Try
> this one from the Institute for
> Certified Application Security
> Specialists: http://www.asscert.com/
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 7:41 AM, Nicholas Lemonias.
> <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com
> <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>> wrote:
>
> Thanks Michal,
>
> We are just trying to improve Google's security and
> contribute to the research community after all. If you
> are still on EFNet give me a shout some time.
>
> We have done so and consulted to hundreds of clients
> including Microsoft, Nokia, Adobe and some of the
> world's biggest corporations. We are also strict
> supporters of the ACM code of conduct.
>
> Regards,
> Nicholas Lemonias.
> AISec
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:29 AM, Nicholas Lemonias.
> <lem.nikolas@...glemail.com
> <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>> wrote:
>
> Hi Jerome,
>
> Thank you for agreeing on access control, and
> separation of duties.
>
> However successful exploitation permits arbitrary
> write() of any file of choice.
>
> I could release an exploit code in C Sharp or
> Python that permits multiple file uploads of any
> file/types, if the Google security team feels that
> this would be necessary. This is unpaid work, so
> we are not so keen on that job.
> ||
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 14, 2014 at 6:04 AM, Jerome Athias
> <athiasjerome@...il.com
> <mailto:athiasjerome@...il.com>> wrote:
>
> Hi
>
> I concur that we are mainly discussing a
> terminology problem.
>
> In the context of a Penetration Test or WAPT,
> this is a Finding.
> Reporting this finding makes sense in this
> context.
>
> As a professional, you would have to explain
> if/how this finding is a
> Weakness*, a Violation (/Regulations,
> Compliance, Policies or
> Requirements[1])
> * I would say Weakness + Exposure =
> Vulnerability. Vulnerability +
> Exploitability (PoC) = Confirmed Vulnerability
> that needs Business
> Impact and Risk Analysis
>
> So I would probably have reported this Finding
> as a Weakness (and not
> Vulnerability. See: OWASP, WASC-TC, CWE),
> explaining that it is not
> Best Practice (your OWASP link and Cheat
> Sheets), and even if
> mitigative/compensative security controls (Ref
> Orange Book), security
> controls like white listing (or at least black
> listing. see also
> ESAPI) should be 1) part of the [1]security
> requirements of a proper
> SDLC (Build security in) as per
> Defense-in-Depth security principles
> and 2) used and implemented correctly.
> NB: A simple Threat Model (i.e. list of CAPEC)
> would be a solid
> support to your report
> This would help to evaluate/measure the risk
> (e.g. CVSS).
> Helping the decision/actions around this risk
>
> PS: interestingly, in this case, I'm not sure
> that the Separation of
> Duties security principle was applied
> correctly by Google in term of
> Risk Acceptance (which could be another Finding)
>
> So in few words, be careful with the
> terminology. (don't always say
> vulnerability like the media say hacker, see
> RFC1392) Use a CWE ID
> (e.g. CWE-434, CWE-183, CWE-184 vs. CWE-616)
>
> My 2 bitcents
> Sorry if it is not edible :)
> Happy Hacking!
>
> /JA
> https://github.com/athiasjerome/XORCISM
>
> 2014-03-14 7:19 GMT+03:00 Michal Zalewski
> <lcamtuf@...edump.cx
> <mailto:lcamtuf@...edump.cx>>:
> > Nicholas,
> >
> > I remember my early years in the infosec
> community - and sadly, so do
> > some of the more seasoned readers of this
> list :-) Back then, I
> > thought that the only thing that mattered is
> the ability to find bugs.
> > But after some 18 years in the industry, I
> now know that there's an
> > even more important and elusive skill.
> >
> > That skill boils down to having a robust
> mental model of what
> > constitutes a security flaw - and being able
> to explain your thinking
> > to others in a precise and internally
> consistent manner that convinces
> > others to act. We need this because the
> security of a system can't be
> > usefully described using abstract terms:
> even the academic definitions
> > ultimately boil down to saying "the system
> is secure if it doesn't do
> > the things we *really* don't want it to do".
> >
> > In this spirit, the term "vulnerability" is
> generally reserved for
> > behaviors that meet all of the following
> criteria:
> >
> > 1) The behavior must have negative
> consequences for at least one of
> > the legitimate stakeholders (users, service
> owners, etc),
> >
> > 2) The consequences must be widely seen as
> unexpected and unacceptable,
> >
> > 3) There must be a realistic chance of such
> a negative outcome,
> >
> > 4) The behavior must introduce substantial
> new risks that go beyond
> > the previously accepted trade-offs.
> >
> > If we don't have that, we usually don't have
> a case, no matter how
> > clever the bug is.
> >
> > Cheers (and happy hunting!),
> > /mz
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> > Charter:
> http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia -
> http://secunia.com/
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter:
> http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>
>
>
>
> --
> "There's a reason we separate military and the police: one
> fights the enemy of the state, the other serves and
> protects the people. When the military becomes both, then
> the enemies of the state tend to become the people."
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> "There's a reason we separate military and the police: one fights
> the enemy of the state, the other serves and protects the people. When
> the military becomes both, then the enemies of the state tend to
> become the people."
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
> Nicholas Lemonias. <mailto:lem.nikolas@...glemail.com>
> 14 March 2014 11:38
> Jerome of Mcafee has made a very valid point on revisiting separation
> of duties in this security instance.
>
> Happy to see more professionals with some skills. Some others have
> also mentioned the feasibility for Denial of Service attacks. Remote
> code execution by Social Engineering is also a prominent scenario.
>
> If you can't tell that that is a vulnerability (probably coming from a
> bunch of CEH's), I feel sorry for those consultants.
>
> Nicholas.
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html
> Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
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