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Message-ID: <5347B9A3.4080805@redbarn.org>
Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 02:45:07 -0700
From: Paul Vixie <paul@...barn.org>
To: Juergen Christoffel <jc@...er.net>
Cc: "fulldisclosure@...lists.org" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: Re: [FD] heartbleed OpenSSL bug CVE-2014-0160
Juergen Christoffel wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 10, 2014 at 11:32:21PM -0700, Paul Vixie wrote:
>> [...]
>> really bruce? on a scale of doesn't-matter-at-all to
>> worst-thing-you-could-have-previously-imagined, a read only exploit is
>> even worse than that?
>
> With all due respect to your ego Paul, I think you might
> under-estimate the
> long term effects: private keys get stolen, this allows people to play
> man-in-the-middle, people (the masses) will renew their certificates but
> might re-use their generated private keys because the don't know exactly
> what they are doing, etc.
thanks for whatever respect may be due, but bruce is still wrong. the
cost to fix this is:
1. replace all private keys
2. replace all passwords
3. upgrade all SSL software
that rates 9 out of 10, where 10 is the worst thing i could have
imagined pre-heartbleed, which is remote file modification and/or remote
code execution, because the costs in that case would be:
1. inclusive of [1..3] above
2. replace all operating systems
3. audit or replace all user data
> As the EFF's traces back into 2013 might tell us, some bad guys exploited
> this for some time now. If this is the case, we might soon arrive at the
> conclusion that we need to exchange all certificates which had been
> created
> in the last two years.
we already have to do that, since we have to assume the worst whenever
we don't have log files which somehow prove a negative.
>
> While I hope it tends to your interpretation, I fear a bit that it
> might be
> Bruces in the long run.
bruce was spouting nonsense. heartbleed's costs will not be higher than
previously imaginable.
vixie
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