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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.02.1404171815040.5393@argo.troja.mff.cuni.cz>
Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2014 18:50:06 +0200 (CEST)
From: Pavel Kankovsky <peak@...o.troja.mff.cuni.cz>
To: Georgi Guninski <guninski@...inski.com>
Cc: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: Re: [FD] Should openssl accept weak DSA/DH keys with g = +/- 1 ?
On Wed, 16 Apr 2014, Georgi Guninski wrote:
> AFAICT weak DH keys can't be recognized
> since they can be well formed.
You can check whether the modulus is a safe prime (p = 2q + 1
where q is a prime number as well) and whether the generator is not a
degenerate one (g != +/- 1; this is sufficient to prove that the order
of g is either q or 2q).
Does anyone use non-safe primes for DH? Afaik any well-known moduli
are safe. And openssl dhparam generates safe primes only.
The check would burn quite a lot of CPU cycles but it would be feasible
and the client could cache results because bening servers are expected to
switch groups rather infrequently.
> The hardness of the discrete log doesn't depend on the size of $p$ but
> on the size of $q$ which is the largest prime factor of the
> multiplicative order of $g$.
No. It depends on both of those sizes in the sense that for some moduli
the algorithm whose complexity depends on q (Pollard's rho?) is better,
for other moduli other algorithms (e.g. NFS) depending on p (L_p(a,c) to
be precise) are more efficient.
--
Pavel Kankovsky aka Peak / Jeremiah 9:21 \
"For death is come up into our MS Windows(tm)..." \ 21st century edition /
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