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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.02.1404171815040.5393@argo.troja.mff.cuni.cz> Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2014 18:50:06 +0200 (CEST) From: Pavel Kankovsky <peak@...o.troja.mff.cuni.cz> To: Georgi Guninski <guninski@...inski.com> Cc: fulldisclosure@...lists.org Subject: Re: [FD] Should openssl accept weak DSA/DH keys with g = +/- 1 ? On Wed, 16 Apr 2014, Georgi Guninski wrote: > AFAICT weak DH keys can't be recognized > since they can be well formed. You can check whether the modulus is a safe prime (p = 2q + 1 where q is a prime number as well) and whether the generator is not a degenerate one (g != +/- 1; this is sufficient to prove that the order of g is either q or 2q). Does anyone use non-safe primes for DH? Afaik any well-known moduli are safe. And openssl dhparam generates safe primes only. The check would burn quite a lot of CPU cycles but it would be feasible and the client could cache results because bening servers are expected to switch groups rather infrequently. > The hardness of the discrete log doesn't depend on the size of $p$ but > on the size of $q$ which is the largest prime factor of the > multiplicative order of $g$. No. It depends on both of those sizes in the sense that for some moduli the algorithm whose complexity depends on q (Pollard's rho?) is better, for other moduli other algorithms (e.g. NFS) depending on p (L_p(a,c) to be precise) are more efficient. -- Pavel Kankovsky aka Peak / Jeremiah 9:21 \ "For death is come up into our MS Windows(tm)..." \ 21st century edition / _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list http://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
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