Message-ID: <CAH8yC8k0wqUe1CmniEY4v78y8ewr=aVAs9Gk2YAj9_PY3ReF1w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 18:33:58 -0400
From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@...il.com>
To: Stefan Kanthak <stefan.kanthak@...go.de>
Cc: Full Disclosure List <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>,
	BugTraq <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>
Subject: Re: [FD] Beginners error: iTunes for Windows runs rogue program
 C:\Program.exe when opening associated files

> the current version of iTunes for Windows (and of course older versions
> too) associates the following vulnerable command lines with some of the
> supported file types/extensions:

They also install Bonjour and a couple of other services as NT
Authorty/SYSTEM, don't drop privileges, and open listening sockets.

Avoid Apple software on Windows like the plague....

On Wed, Apr 30, 2014 at 3:02 PM, Stefan Kanthak <stefan.kanthak@...go.de> wrote:
> Hi @ll,
>
> the current version of iTunes for Windows (and of course older versions
> too) associates the following vulnerable command lines with some of the
> supported file types/extensions:
>
> daap=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url "%1"
> itls=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url "%1"
> itms=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url "%1"
> itmss=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url "%1"
> itpc=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url "%1"
> itsradio=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url "%1"
> iTunes=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url "%1"
> iTunes.AssocProtocol.daap=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url "%1"
> iTunes.AssocProtocol.itls=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url "%1"
> iTunes.AssocProtocol.itms=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url "%1"
> iTunes.AssocProtocol.itmss=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url"%1"
> iTunes.AssocProtocol.itpc=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url "%1"
> iTunes.AssocProtocol.pcast=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url"%1"
> itunesradio=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url "%1"
> pcast=C:\Program Files (x86)\iTunes\iTunes.exe /url "%1"
>
>
> The command line registered under
>
> [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Clients\Media\iTunes\shell\open\command]
> @="C:\Program Files\iTunes\iTunes.exe"
>
> shows the same beginners error too: an unquoted pathname allows the
> execution of the rogue programs "C:\Program.exe" or "C:\Program Files.exe"
> instead of the intended executable.
>
>
> From <http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc144175.aspx>
> or <http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc144101.aspx>:
>
> | Note: If any element of the command string contains or might contain
>         ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> | spaces, it must be enclosed in quotation marks. Otherwise, if the
>   ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> | element contains a space, it will not parse correctly. For instance,
> | "My Program.exe" starts the application properly. If you use
> | My Program.exe without quotation marks, then the system attempts to
> | launch My with Program.exe as its first command line argument. You
> | should always use quotation marks with arguments such as "%1" that are
> | expanded to strings by the Shell, because you cannot be certain that
> | the string will not contain a space.
>
>
> "Long" filenames containing spaces exist for about 20 years in Windows.
> It's REALLY time that every developer and every QA engineer knows how
> to handle them properly.
>
>
> If you detect such silly bugs: report them and get them fixed.
> If the vendor does not fix them: trash the trash!
>
>
> JFTR: this bugs only exists since Microsoft "masks" it.
>       See <http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms682425.aspx> for this
>       well-known idiosyncrasy:
>
> | For example, consider the string "c:\program files\sub dir\program name".
> | This string can be interpreted in a number of ways.
> | The system tries to interpret the possibilities in the following order:
> | c:\program.exe files\sub dir\program name
> | c:\program files\sub.exe dir\program name
> | c:\program files\sub dir\program.exe name
> | c:\program files\sub dir\program name.exe
>
>       Without this kludge this beginners error would get caught upon
>       the very first use of any of these command lines.
>
>
> Since every user account created during Windows setup has administrative
> rights every user owning such an account can create the rogue program,
> resulting in a privilege escalation.
>
> JFTR: no, the "user account control" is not a security boundary!
>
>
> regards
> Stefan Kanthak
>
>
> PS: for static detection of these silly beginners errors download and
>     run <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/download/SLOPPY.CMD>
>
>     To catch all instances of this beginners error download
>     <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/download/SENTINEL.CMD>,
>     <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/download/SENTINEL.DLL> and
>     <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/download/SENTINEL.EXE>, then read
>     and run SENTINEL.CMD

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