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Message-ID: <CAESArwmcr3fZJGRKmbMBOqYGDD=5ov5TFg8PbUSx7xvdvbGgKw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 14 Jun 2014 10:55:52 -0700
From: Reed Black <reed@...afeword.org>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] Onnto RAID Master rev358 for OS X - multiple remote
vulnerabilities
I haven't managed to get any reply from Onnto after several weeks of
attempted contact.
Onnto manufactures RAID peripherals and provides drivers and configuration
utilities. As part of the install for their OS X "RAID Master" utility[1],
they install copies of apache 2.2.22, php 5.3.16, openssl 1.0.1f. apache
server is configured to listen on port 8848, and presents a RAID
configuration interface.
Problems:
The server listens to port 8848 on all interfaces.
The web service is unauthenticated. A network attacker or unprivileged
local user can alter or destroy a RAID array using a regular web browser.
The web service does not sanitize browser input before concatenating it to
a shell command and executing. At multiple points in ajax.php, a remote
user can execute arbitrary shell commands as the 'daemon' user if he or she
is willing to alter the RAID array as a side effect. Shell commands can be
concatenated on each argument to the RAID setup.
The web service does not protect against CSRF.
The bundled versions of apache2, php5 and openssl all contain multiple
vulnerabilities, including further potential for remote users executing
arbitrary code. There is no update mechanism in place, nor have they
provided newer builds.
The RAID configuration utility does not advise the user that it is opening
a service on all ports (or even disclose that it is installing a web server
in the first place). Users may not realize that they are exposing a
vulnerable service on the local network, or installing web services that
need updates.
[1] http://www.onnto.com.tw/download_raid_master.asp
Applies to ThunderBoltRaid_rev358, the newest version of RAID Master
available for download
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