Message-ID: <CAOJKFBDjUGhess74_sC7Ep3mmC5Sgs2hou9Fe3OtfSFyLWdZ7g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 24 Jul 2014 16:23:33 -0500
From: Brandon Perry <bperry.volatile@...il.com>
To: Stefan Kanthak <stefan.kanthak@...go.de>
Cc: "fulldisclosure@...lists.org" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>,
	bugtraq@...urityfocus.com
Subject: Re: [FD] Beginner's error: import function of Windows Mail executes
 rogue program C:\Program.exe with credentials of other account

So, I am very curious how you are finding these? Have you automated this or
is it manual hand work?


On Wed, Jul 23, 2014 at 2:50 PM, Stefan Kanthak <stefan.kanthak@...go.de>
wrote:

> Hi @ll,
>
> the import function of Windows Mail executes a rogue program C:\Program.exe
> with the credentials of another account, resulting in a privilege
> escalation!
>
> 1. Fetch <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/download/SENTINEL.EXE> and save
> it as
>    C:\Program.exe
>
> 2. Start Windows Mail (part of Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008)
>
> 3. On the File menu, click Identities
>
> 4. On the entry page of the wizard click [ Continue > ]
>
> 5. Select "(*) Import identities of other Windows account" and click [
> Continue > ]
>
> 6. Enter account name and password of any Windows account
>
> 7. See the message from C:\Program.exe when Windows Mail runs the UNQUOTED
>    command line C:\Program Files\Windows Mail\WinMail.Exe /identcatalog
>
>
> From <http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc144175.aspx>
> or <http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc144101.aspx>:
>
> | Note: If any element of the command string contains or might contain
> | spaces, it must be enclosed in quotation marks. Otherwise, if the
> | element contains a space, it will not parse correctly. For instance,
> | "My Program.exe" starts the application properly. If you use
> | My Program.exe without quotation marks, then the system attempts to
> | launch My with Program.exe as its first command line argument.
>
>
> From <http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/ms682425.aspx>:
>
> | Security Remarks
> |
> | The lpApplicationName parameter can be NULL, and the executable name
> | must be the first white space-delimited string in lpCommandLine.
> | If the executable or path name has a space in it, there is a risk that
> | a different executable could be run because of the way the function
> | parses spaces. Avoid the following example, because the function
> | attempts to run "Program.exe", if it exists, instead of "MyApp.exe".
> ...
> | If a malicious user were to create an application called "Program.exe"
> | on a system, any program that incorrectly calls CreateProcess using
> | the Program Files directory will run this application instead of the
> | intended application.
> |
> | To avoid this problem, do not pass NULL for lpApplicationName.
> | If you do pass NULL for lpApplicationName, use quotation marks around
> | the executable path in lpCommandLine, as shown in the example below.
>
>
> "Long" filenames were introduced 20 years ago, but M$FTs developers still
> can't handle them properly, and their QA is unable to detect such silly
> and trivial to spot bugs!
>
>
> regards
> Stefan Kanthak
>
> PS: yes, it needs administrative privileges to write C:\Program.exe.
>     BUT: all the user account(s) created during Windows setup have
>     administrative privileges.
>
> PPS: NO, the user account control is NO security boundary!
>
>      <http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2526083>
>
> | Same-desktop Elevation in UAC is not a security boundary and can be
> hijacked
> | by unprivileged software that runs on the same desktop. Same-desktop
> | Elevation should be considered a convenience feature, and from a security
> | perspective, "Protected Administrator" should be considered the
> equivalent
> | of "Administrator."
>
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