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Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2014 22:34:48 +0000
From: Thomas Hibbert <>
To: "" <>
Subject: [FD] F5 Unauthenticated rsync access to Remote Root Code Execution

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F5 Unauthenticated rsync access to Remote Root Code Execution

Affected Versions: F5 BIG-IP 11.x versions before 11.6.0, 11.5.1 HF3, 11.5.0 HF4, 
                   11.4.1 HF, 11.4.0 HF7, 11.3.0 HF9, and 11.2.1 HF11, 
                   Enterprise Manager 3.x versions before 3.1.1 HF2

| Description |

When configured in a high availability mode, the F5 solution suffers from an 
unauthenticated rsync access vulnerability that can be leveraged to upload a
malicious SSH key and gain remote root access to the appliance.

The BigIP platform configures an rsync daemon listening on the ConfigSync
interfaces when the system is configured in a failover mode. The rsync 
daemon as currently configured does not require any authentication and the 
"cmi" module has complete read/write access to the system. If the ConfigSync
IP addresses are accessible by a malicious third party, it is possible to
upload an authorized_keys file directly into the /var/ssh/root directory and
then open a root SSH session on the f5 device.

| Exploitation |

Detailed exploitation information is available in the PDF version of this
Advisory, available at

| Solution |

F5 have published a detailed advisory, including patch and mitigation 
information, at the following URL:

| Disclosure Timeline |

24-04-2014: Vendor notified at
24-04-2014: Vendor responds with intent to investigate, and opens a support
            ticket to track the issue
05-05-2014: First follow up sent
06-05-2014: Vendor responds with internal bug numbers
10-05-2014: Vendor advises code fixes are complete and offers an embargo 
            date of 29-08-2014 for advisory release
12-05-2014: Embargo date accepted
29-08-2014: Advisory released

About is Australasia's leading team of Information Security
consultants specialising in providing high quality Information Security 
services to clients throughout the Asia Pacific region. Our clients include
some of the largest globally recognised companies in areas such as finance,
telecommunications, broadcasting, legal and government. Our aim is to provide
the very best independent advice and a high level of technical expertise while
creating long and lasting professional relationships with our clients. is committed to security research and development,
and its team continues to identify and responsibly publish vulnerabilities
in public and private software vendor's products. Members of the R&D team are globally recognised through their release
of whitepapers and presentations related to new security research.

For further information on this issue or any of our service offerings, 
contact us:

Phone +64 4 470 1650

Thomas Hibbert
Security Consultant

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