[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CALx_OUAwtzFR9BOCA4hCegutZ3o4wx_Rq_3nkbcZWyGw3eOpOg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Sep 2014 18:30:20 -0700
From: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@...edump.cx>
To: bugtraq <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com>,
"fulldisclosure@...lists.org" <fulldisclosure@...lists.org>
Subject: [FD] Uninit memory disclosure via truncated images in Firefox
Yello,
The recent release of Firefox 32 fixes another interesting image
parsing issue found by afl [1]: following a refactoring of memory
management code, the past few versions of the browser ended up using
uninitialized memory for certain types of truncated images, which is
easily measurable with a simple <canvas> + toDataURL() harness that
examines all the fuzzer-generated test cases.
Depending on a variety of factors, problems like that may leak secrets
across web origins, or more prosaically, may help attackers bypass
security measures such as ASLR. Here's a short proof-of-concept that
should work if you haven't updated to 32 yet:
http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/ffgif/
This is tracked as CVE-2014-1564, Mozilla bug 1045977, MFSA 2014-69.
[1] http://code.google.com/p/american-fuzzy-lop/
PS. Mildly interesting:
http://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/client-identification-mechanisms
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
http://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists