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Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2014 10:03:30 +1000
From: Lord Tuskington <l.tuskington@...il.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] Cyanogenmod MITM: proven, despite cyanogenmod's public denail

After reading el reg's article regarding a cyanogenmod MITM flaw, I started
looking through the code to see if I could find it. It didn't take long.
This finding was not what users are led to believe by cyanogenmod's blog
post:

http://www.cyanogenmod.org/blog/in-response-to-the-register-mitm-article

I reported the issue to cyanogenmod, but got a rather unsatisfactory reply.
They didn't seem willing to modify the blog post to more accurately reflect
the problem. Below is my email exchange with cyanogenmod's security address:

 Lord Tuskington,

 Thank your for your response. Truth is we assumed as much, but the lack of
meaningful information in the Register's sensational article didn't leave
us much room to interpret it besides what it presented at face value.

 As you noted, this has already been addressed in our shipping code branch
(cm-11), prior to the article's publishing. This was the net result of the
messaging provided in the blog post, with CM 11 being 'safe' from this
issue.

 We normally do not patch non-shipping code (in this case 10.2 and prior),
though we may in this case.

 We do not expect to make a advisory on the 10.2 item at this time.

 Thank you,
Abhisek Devkota

  On Oct 17, 2014 8:50 PM, "Lord Tuskington" <l.tuskington@...il.com> wrote:
  Hello from Greenland!

I think you may be confused about the issue discussed here:
http://www.cyanogenmod.org/blog/in-response-to-the-register-mitm-article

If I understand correctly, the original reporter may have been referring to
a vulnerability fixed by this commit, which was merged 20 days ago:

https://github.com/CyanogenMod/android_external_apache-http/commit/f925f10b1feba92868fd4e8966592ec1bf755d67

The vulnerable code is still present in the cm-10.2 branch:

https://github.com/CyanogenMod/android_external_apache-http/blob/cm-10.2/src/org/apache/http/conn/ssl/AbstractVerifier.java#L228-244
If you release an advisory, please credit "Lord Tuskington of TuskCorp" for
reporting this vulnerability responsibly.

Regards

Lord Tuskington
Chief Financial Pinniped
TuskCorp

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