full-disclosure - [FD] Keurig 2.0 Genuine K-Cup Spoofing Vulnerability

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Message-ID: <CAKueL6ddPm5PQK0gYDKdVzxk_KzD91f_rzRqrQywzuj6GEBRFw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 13:04:20 -0500
From: Kenneth Buckler <kenneth.buckler@...il.com>
To: fulldisclosure@...lists.org
Subject: [FD] Keurig 2.0 Genuine K-Cup Spoofing Vulnerability

*Overview*

Keurig 2.0 Coffee Maker contains a vulnerability in which the authenticity
of coffee pods, known as K-Cups, uses weak verification methods, which are
subject to a spoofing attack through re-use of a previously verified K-Cup.

*Impact*

CVSS Base Score: 4.9

Impact Subscore: 6.9

Exploitability Subscore: 3.9

Access Vector: Local

Access Complexity: Low

Authentication: None

Confidentiality Impact: None

Integrity Impact: Complete

Availability Impact: None

*Vulnerable Versions*

Keurig 2.0 Coffee Maker

*Technical Details*

Keurig 2.0 is designed to only use genuine Keurig approved coffee K-Cups.
However, a flaw in the verification method allows an attacker to use
unauthorized K-Cups. The Keurig 2.0 does verify that the K-Cup foil lid
used for verification is not re-used.

Step 1: Attacker uses a genuine K-Cup in the Keurig machine to brew coffee
or hot chocolate.

Step 2: After brewing is complete, attacker removes the genuine K-Cup from
the Keurig and uses a knife or scissors to carefully remove the full foil
lid from the K-Cup, ensuring to keep the full edges intact. Attacker keeps
this for use in the attack.

Step 3: Attacker inserts a non-genuine K-Cup in the Keurig, and closes the
lid. Attacker should receive an "oops" error message stating that the K-Cup
is not genuine.

Step 4: Attacker opens the Keurig, leaving the non-genuine K-Cup in the
Keurig, and carefully places the previously saved genuine K-Cup lid on top
of the non-genuine K-Cup, lining up the puncture hole to keep the lid in
place.

Step 5: Attacker closes the Keurig, and is able to brew coffee using the
non-genuine K-Cup.

Since no fix is currently available, owners of Keurig 2.0 systems may wish
to take additional steps to secure the device, such as keeping the device
in a locked cabinet, or using a cable lock to prevent the device from being
plugged in when not being used by an authorized user.

Please note that a proof of concept is already available online.

*Credit: *

Proof of concept at http://www.keurighack.com/

Vulnerability Writeup by Ken Buckler, Caffeine Security
http://caffeinesecurity.blogspot.com

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