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Message-ID: <CCAA9D60257F4A2199901423986D0E88@W340> Date: Thu, 19 Feb 2015 19:27:53 +0100 From: "Stefan Kanthak" <stefan.kanthak@...go.de> To: <bugtraq@...urityfocus.com> Cc: fulldisclosure@...lists.org Subject: [FD] iTunes 12.1.1 for Windows: still outdated and VULNERABLE 3rd party libraries, still UNQUOTED and VULNERABLE pathnames C:\Program Files\... Hi @ll, the just released iTunes 12.1.1 for Windows still comes with outdated and VULNERABLE 3rd party libraries and vulnerable command lines: In AppleMobileDeviceSupport.msi: * libeay32.dll and ssleay32.dll 0.9.8za from 2014-06-05 The current version is 0.9.8ze and has 21 security fixes which are missing in 0.9.8za; see <http://openssl.org/news/> At last, these DLLs are no more 7 years old as before, but "only" 8 months old. * libcurl.dll 7.16.2 is EIGHT years old and has at least 22 unfixed CVEs! The current version is 7.40.0; for the fixed vulnerabilities see <http://curl.haxx.se/docs/security.html> An attacker can load these vulnerable DLLs and call their buggy routines to exploit these bugs! In AppleApplicationSupport.msi: * msvcr100.dll and msvcp100.dll 10.0.40219.1 from 2011-02-20 These are the runtime DLLs for Visual C++ 2010 RTM. The current version is but 10.0.40219.325; see https://technet.microsoft.com/library/security/bulletin/MS11-025 An attacker can load these vulnerable DLLs and and call their buggy routines to exploit their bugs! Additionally the following VULNERABLE[*] command lines with unquoted pathnames containing spaces are registered. By AppleApplicationSupport.msi: [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{fdd068c2-d51a-4175-8a20-5cbc704ea3bd}\LocalServer32] @="[#AppleApplicationSupport_APSDaemon.exe]" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{6812639B-FD61-4329-9901-22CFDBD690FE}\LocalServer32] @="[#AppleApplicationSupport_APSDaemon.exe]" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{D9E904CA-8865-42E7-B0F0-B7B8C4D54D70}\LocalServer32] @="[#AppleApplicationSupport_APSDaemon.exe]" For beginners: the value of the unnamed registry entry is a COMMAND LINE and has to be quoted properly! >From <https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms683844.aspx> | To help provide system security, use quoted strings in the path to | indicate where the executable filename ends and the arguments begin. As of Windows 2003 developers who are NOT completely unaware of Microsofts documentation might want to use the "ServerExecutable" registry entry described there too. But 12 years are surely way too short for Apple's developers, QA and management to learn about such "new" features which help improve safety and security. By iTunes.msi: [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\itms\shell\open\command] @="[#iTunes.exe] /url \"%1\"" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\iTunes\shell\open\command] @="[#iTunes.exe] /url \"%1\"" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\daap\shell\open\command] @="[#iTunes.exe] /url \"%1\"" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\itmss\shell\open\command] @="[#iTunes.exe] /url \"%1\"" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\itsradio\shell\open\command] @="[#iTunes.exe] /url \"%1\"" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\itunesradio\shell\open\command] @="[#iTunes.exe] /url \"%1\"" [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Clients\Media\iTunes\shell\open\command] @="[#iTunes.exe]" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\itpc\shell\open\command] @="[#iTunes.exe] /url \"%1\"" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\itls\shell\open\command] @="[#iTunes.exe] /url \"%1\"" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\iTunes.AssocProtocol.itls\shell\open\command] @="[INSTALLDIR]iTunes.exe /url \"%1\"" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\pcast\shell\open\command] @="[INSTALLDIR]iTunes.exe /url \"%1\"" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\iTunes.AssocProtocol.daap\shell\open\command] @="[INSTALLDIR]iTunes.exe /url \"%1\"" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\iTunes.AssocProtocol.itms\shell\open\command] @="[INSTALLDIR]iTunes.exe /url \"%1\"" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\iTunes.AssocProtocol.itmss\shell\open\command] @="[INSTALLDIR]iTunes.exe /url \"%1\"" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\iTunes.AssocProtocol.itpc\shell\open\command] @="[INSTALLDIR]iTunes.exe /url \"%1\"" [HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\iTunes.AssocProtocol.pcast\shell\open\command] @="[INSTALLDIR]iTunes.exe /url \"%1\"" >From <http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc144175.aspx>: | If any element of the command string contains or might contain | spaces, it must be enclosed in quotation marks. Otherwise, if ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | the element contains a space, it will not parse correctly. JFTR: the command lines referenced above are about 1/3 of all the command lines registered by iTunes.msi; the other 2/3 have properly quoted pathnames. See <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/sentinel.html> if you want to detect software with this 20+ year old vulnerability[*] without dissecting its *.MSI files. Until Apple's developers, their QA and their managers start to develop a sense for their customers safety and security and due diligence: stay away from Apple's (Windows) software! stay tuned Stefan Kanthak [*] <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/428.html> You'll read more about it soon! _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
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